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Abstract
Models using the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) are widely recog-
nized to be inconsistent with the observed behavior of premia in financial mar-
kets, as well as other features of asset price dynamics. Moreover, many reasons
have been advanced as to why the REH cannot generally represent, even ap-
proximately, the expectations behavior of individually rational agents.
In this paper, we develop a new model of the equilibrium premium in the
foreign exchange market that replaces the REH with the Imperfect Knowledge
Forecasting (IKF) framework. Because we maintain that agents must cope with
imperfect knowledge and that they are not grossly irrational, our IKF approach
imposes only qualitative conditions on the formation of individual forecasting
models and their updating.
We also develop a dynamic extension of the original formulation of Kah-
neman and Tversky’s prospect theory. We find that under IKF and dynamic
prospect theory, the equilibrium premium on foreign exchange is positively re-
lated to the gap between the aggregate forecast of the exchange rate and its
historical benchmark level. We test this implication, using survey data on the
German mark-U.S. dollar exchange rate, and find that the behavior of the ex
ante premium on foreign exchange is consistent with our model of the premium.
Of course, compared with the precise predictions we have learnt to expect in
the physical sciences, this sort of mere pattern predictions is a second best...I
am anxious to repeat, we will still achieve predictions which can be falsified
and which therefore are of empirical significance... Yet the danger of which I
want to warn is precisely the belief that in order to be accepted as scientific
it is necessary to achieve more. This way lies charlatanism and more. To
act on the belief that we possess the knowledge,...which in fact we do not
possess, is likely to make us do much harm...I confess that I prefer true but
imperfect knowledge, even if it leaves much indetermined and unpredictable,
to a pretence of exact knowledge that is likely to be false. (Excerpts from
the Nobel lecture of Friedrich Hayek, 1978, p.33).
1 Introduction
The almost universal use of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH)
testifies to the widespread belief among economists that the REH provides
the solution to the enduring problem of modeling the expectations of rational
agents. Yet it is precisely in settings in which agents’ expectations matter
most, such as asset markets, that REH-based models encounter their greatest
diﬃculties.
In the foreign exchange market, Dornbusch and Frankel surmised that
The chief problem with the overshooting theory, and indeed with
the more general rational expectations approach, is that it does
not explain well the shorter-term [long-swings] dynamics (Dorn-
busch and Frankel, 1988, p. 16).1
But until recently, such observations have been largely ignored — despite re-
search of the past two decades that indicates that the implications of the REH
approach are inconsistent with much of the empirical evidence on exchange
rates and other asset prices.2,3
1For early studies documenting the diﬃculties of the REH approach in explaining the
observed movements of the term structure of interest rates and stock prices, see Shiller
(1979, 1981).
2For examples of recent surveys of anomalous behavior (by REH standards) of exchange
rates see Frankel and Rose (1995) and Engel (1996) and references therein.
3 It should also be noted that the REH does not, in general, represent, even approx-
imately, the expectations of individually rational agents. For an early discussion of the
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The widespread belief that the REH is the model for the expectations of
rational agents has recently given rise to a view that — to explain the observed
asset-price dynamics — departures from “rationality" need to be introduced
into models of asset markets.4 We believe, however, that a diﬀerent factor
may be key to understanding the apparently anomalous behavior of asset
prices.
In this paper, we develop a new model of the equilibrium premium in
the foreign exchange market. The key assumption underlying our approach
(dubbed the Imperfect Knowledge Forecasting, IKF, framework) is that eco-
nomic agents — in formulating and revising their forecasting models — are
limited by imperfect knowledge.5 While we maintain that agents must cope
with imperfect knowledge, we do not diﬀer in the presumption that, on the
whole, economic agents are not grossly irrational, in the sense that they do
not pass up — endlessly — profit opportunities. Consequently, the IKF frame-
work — in contrast to the extant approaches to the modeling of expectations,
including the REH — imposes only qualitative conditions on the formulation
of individual forecasting models and their revisions.6
The second distinctive feature of our approach is that we develop a dy-
namic extension of the original formulation of Kahneman and Tversky’s
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 and Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1992). This dynamic prospect theory assumes that agents are not only
loss averse, but that they are more sensitive to changes in potential losses
than to changes in potential gains of the same size. We find that under dy-
namic prospect theory, both bulls and bears hold open positions in foreign
assumptions under which each of the individually rational agents would “choose” to use
only one common model and other related epistemological problems besetting the REH
approach, see Frydman (1982), Frydman and Phelps (1983), Frydman (1983) and Phelps
(1983).
4See Akerlof (2002), and references therein, for a recent discussion on the important
role of “irrationality” for understanding asset price dynamics.
5This IKF framework has its roots in Keynes (1936), whose ideas on the behavior of
asset markets influenced much of the analysis in this paper. Hayek’s (1948) penetrating
critique of socialist planning and his insights on the use of knowledge in society have also
guided us in the development of our approach.
6This qualitative approach is put forth in Frydman and Goldberg (2003a). In that paper
we argue that if an economist were to characterize fully individual forecasting models and
their revisions (i.e. in terms of fixed rules or generalizations of those rules that depend
on observable variables or factors), then the resulting formulations would be, in general,
inconsistent with the postulate of individual rationality. See the concluding remarks below
for further discussion of this point.
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exchange only if they expect a positive excess return on their open positions,
to compensate them for their extra sensitivity to the potential losses. This
result leads to a new, momentary, equilibrium condition for the foreign ex-
change market, which we call uncertainty adjusted uncovered interest rate
parity (UAUIP). The UAUIP condition implies that equilibrium in the for-
eign exchange market is associated with an aggregate premium on foreign
exchange — dubbed an equilibrium uncertainty premium — that depends on
the relative assessments of bulls and bears concerning the potential losses
from foreign exchange speculation.
In our model, equilibrium is defined, at each point in time, for a given set
of individual forecasting models. Revisions of these models, then, cause the
equilibrium uncertainty premium to move over time. To model this move-
ment, we follow the IKF framework and impose only qualitative assumptions
on the process by which individual forecasting models are revised. To this
end, we build on an idea put forth by Keynes (1936) and assume that the gap
between agents’ conditional forecasts of the exchange rate and its perceived
historical benchmark plays a key role in how agents’ revise their forecasting
models and their assessments of the potential losses. We find that these in-
dividual gap eﬀects lead to a positive relationship between the equilibrium
uncertainty premium and an aggregate measure of the gap.
We test this implication, using one-month forecasts of the German mark-
U.S. dollar exchange rate fromMoneyMarket Services International (MMSI),
and show that the observed time path of the ex ante premium on foreign ex-
change is indeed consistent with our gap eﬀect. We conjecture that this
new empirical finding — that the gap from the historical benchmark plays
an important role in understanding the dynamics of the premium on foreign
exchange— may also be important in understanding the behavior of equilib-
rium premia in other asset markets. We also show that our IKF-based model
provides a simple explanation of the sign reversals that have been observed
in foreign exchange premia. These positive findings stand in sharp contrast
to the widely known diﬃculties of standard REH models of the risk premium
in explaining the time path, volatility and sign reversals of foreign exchange
premia over the modern period of floating.7
Although prospect theory has been incorporated recently into models of
asset prices, all of the extant applications make use of the representative-
7For review articles, see Lewis (1995) and Engel (1996).
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agent assumption and the REH.8 The REH-based models tie expectations
rigidly to the model formulated by an economist, thereby restricting the up-
dating of expectations to the arrival of new information on macroeconomic
fundamentals. Because these fundamentals are much less volatile than asset
returns, the REH models often rely on modifications of preferences to gen-
erate a greater variance of asset returns.9 This consideration leads Barberis,
Huang and Santos (2001) to adopt a particular interpretation of Kahneman
and Tversky’s (1979) notion of reference dependence, called a “house-money”
eﬀect: “how loss averse the investor is depends on his prior investment per-
formance (Barberis, Huang and Santos, 2001, p. 2).”
To compare the implications of a house-money eﬀect with those of our
gap eﬀect, we formalize a house-money eﬀect in the context of our model
of foreign exchange speculation. In sharp contrast to the implication of our
gap eﬀect, we show that a house money eﬀect implies a negative relationship
between the premia on foreign exchange speculation and the expected gap.
This negative relationship is rejected by empirical evidence.10
The literature in finance and economics has also produced many models
with expectations that depart from the REH. In moving away from the REH
— which attributes to agents a forecasting rule based on one specific model
— economists must confront this key question: which non-REH forecasting
models should be attributed to agents, given that the universe of such models
is, in principle, unbounded?
To limit the universe of potential forecasting models, extant departures
from the REH have relied on important insights from behavioral economics
concerning the behavior of agents in real-world markets.11 Although these
approaches are superior to the REH models from an empirical point of view,
they share one crucial feature with the REH approach: they attribute to
agents specific quantitative forecasting models and fixed mechanisms for how
8See Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001), Barberis and
Huang (2001) and references therein.
9Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) recognize that, even with the assumption of loss
aversion, the standard, REH-based setup is unable to explain the main “perplexing features
of the aggregate data.”
10This finding, however, does not necessarily imply that a house-money eﬀect is irrele-
vant; it may simply mean that the gap eﬀect is stronger than a house-money eﬀect.
11Early approaches to modeling departures from the REH in financial markets include
the seminal studies by Frankel and Froot (1987) and Delong, Shleifer, Summers and Wald-
man (1990a,b). For more recent studies, see Gourinchas and Tornell (2001) and Hong and
Stein (2002, 2003).
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agents update these models. Each one of these formulation is tantamount to
an assumption of one over-arching model with a structure that is unchanging
over time. Such an unchanging structure may involve a finite number of
pre-specified forecasting models along with a fixed rule governing how agents
switch between models in updating their forecasts.12
For example, a large class of standard learning models assumes that all
agents learn and forecast on the basis of a common model and a fixed updat-
ing mechanism throughout the period of learning.(e.g., Evans and Honkapo-
hja, 2001). In the foreign exchange market, Frankel and Froot (1987) assume
an unchanging structure for expectations and their updating: a representa-
tive agent updates his expectations by switching — according to a “fixed”
(Bayesian) rule — between a chartist model and a fundamental model.13
These behaviorally-motivated departures from the REH are an advance
over the REH approach; they do not ignore the fact that agents in real-world
markets may change their forecasting models — rather than merely respond
to the arrival of new information — when updating their forecasts. However,
these departures from the REH neglect the fact that in a world of imperfect
knowledge, agents, in general, not only face a choice among extant models
— which an economist tries to capture by a pre-specified set of models —
but they also invent new models. Moreover, agents also invent new ways of
revising their models that diﬀer from the fixed updating rules attributed to
them by an economist.
Because extant departures from the REH largely ignore the creative as-
pect of the process of the acquisition of knowledge in a market economy,
they also suﬀer from another diﬃculty. Though various forms of irrationali-
ties introduced into these models are well established, and can be plausibly
justified on behavioral grounds, the assumption of an unchanging structure
for expectations and their updating is actually equivalent to a much stronger
assumption about the degree of agents’ irrationality: it assumes agents per-
12This interpretation of “one model” as involving a number (or a class) of pre-specified
models with a fixed rule governing switches between models has also been adopted by the
REH literature. For examples, see Engel and Hamilton (1990) and Hansen and Sargent
(2001a,b). For a critical discussion of this less restrictive, but still REH-based approach
to the modeling of expectations, see Frydman and Goldberg (2002, 2003a) and footnote
61 below.
13For a related approach that also assumes an unchanging structure — consisting of
speculators, who form expectations according to the REH and feedback traders, who
trade on the basis of simple rules — see Delong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990b).
This model features fully informed .
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sist, in perpetuity, in the particular forms of irrationality attributed to them.
In contrast, our IKF approach is predicated on the presumption that
under imperfect knowledge economic agents do not adhere to one unchanging
structure in forming and updating their forecasting models. To do so would
imply gross irrationality, in the sense of endlessly passing up apparent profit
opportunities. Thus, although the extant departures from the REH shed
light on particular episodes of the empirical record, they do not oﬀer a general
approach that can replace the REH as a model of the forecasting process.
This lack of generality may explain why many economists are reluctant to
abandon the REH.
The IKF approach aims to provide a general framework for modeling the
forecasting process, that can replace the REH. The most important distinc-
tion between the non-IKF departures from the REH and our IKF approach
is that we do not attribute specific forecasting mechanisms to agents and
we do not treat the revisions of forecasting models as a mechanical process.
Instead, we recognize that knowledge is imperfect in general and, thus, eco-
nomic agents must choose from among the myriad of existing forecasting
models and decide on whether and how to develop new models.
Because our position is that economic agents are not grossly irrational, we
characterize this creative process in a qualitative as opposed to a quantitative
manner. This qualitative approach frees the economist from having to specify
precisely agents’ forecasting models and how these models are revised. Thus,
the IKF approach is consistent with the creative process of model formulation
and discovery; it is not only compatible with a wide class of existing models —
including those from behavioral economics — but it also allows for forecasting
models yet to be invented.
Contrary to the implicit presumption of the REH approach — that quan-
titative restrictions are needed to impose “discipline” on the analysis — we
show in this paper that qualitative restrictions on the revisions of the individ-
ual forecasting models are able to generate implications that can be rejected
by the data. Moreover, as we demonstrate in this paper, the qualitative IKF
approach is able to explain asset market dynamics that the REH models
deem anomalous.
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2 An Overview of the Paper
Modeling the dynamics of the equilibrium premium on foreign exchange in-
volves two steps: a definition of momentary equilibrium at a point in time
and a specification of the updating of forecasting models, and other factors,
that move this momentary equilibrium over time. In section 3 of this paper,
we use dynamic prospect theory to derive our new momentary equilibrium
at a point in time, UAUIP, while in section 4, we use our IKF framework to
model the movement of this momentary equilibrium over time.
Section 3.1 provides a formal characterization of the individual forecast-
ing models and conditional forecasts of the one-period ahead excess return,
Rt+1 = St+1 − St − FPt, where St and FPt denote the log levels of the ex-
change rate and the forward premium, respectively. We represent individual
i’s forecasting model of Rt+1 in terms of a conditional probability distribution
of the one-period ahead exchange rate, denoted by P it(St+1|X it , θit), where X it
and θit are the time-t information set and set of parameters of this conditional
distribution..14
An individual exchange rate forecast at time t, s˜it+1, is the mean of this
conditional distribution, evaluated at xit, and θ
i
t. The conditional forecast of
the return on a long (short) position of one unit of foreign exchange held from
time t to t+1 is then defined as r˜it+1 = s˜
i
t+1−st−fpt (−r˜it+1 = fpt+st−s˜it+1).15
At a point in time, our assumptions of individual rationality and imperfect
knowledge imply that, in general, individual agents use diﬀerent forecasting
models and therefore form heterogeneous forecasts. In this paper we assume
that the heterogeneity of forecasts entails the presence in the market of both
bulls and bears — speculators who hold long and short positions, respectively.
To clarify the important elements in this overview, we replace a diversity of
forecasting models within the groups of bulls and bears with two forecasting
models, one for a representative bull and the other for a representative bear,
denoted by i =l,s, respectively.16
Because we assume the presence of both bulls and bears in the market,
14As is customary, we will use upper and lower case letters to distinguish between
random variables and their realizations, respectively.
15A long (short) position in foreign exchange is one in which a rise (fall) in the value of
foreign exchange leads to a positive return on the open position.
16In sections 3 and 4 of this paper, we examine aggregation under the heterogeneity of
preferences and forecasting models within each group of bulls and bears and show that
under mild aggregation conditions, our conclusions remain valid.
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a well-defined momentary equilibrium requires that the amount of capital
each speculator chooses to place at risk (i.e., his position size) is limited. We
model this decision problem on position size in section 3.2, by augmenting the
original formulation of prospect theory with an assumption we call dynamic
loss aversion. Dynamic loss aversion assumes that as speculators contemplate
larger open positions — and, thus, contemplate larger potential gains and
losses — they are more sensitive to the increase in the potential losses than
to the concomitant increase in the potential gains.
We next use the standard decomposition of next period’s rate of return,
Rt+1 = R
+
t+1+R
−
t+1
17, to represent potential losses of bulls and bears. Because
bulls (bears) view negative (positive) realizations of Rt+1 as potential losses,
we represent these losses by the variable R−t+1(−R+t+1). Furthermore, we
represent an individual assessment of the potential losses, which we refer to
an expected loss and denote by lit, as the mean of the “loss-part” — R
−
t+1 for
bulls and −R+t+1 for bears — of the individual probability distributions.18
In section 3.2, we show that dynamic loss aversion implies that all agents
limit the size of their gambles when an expected profit opportunity arises.19
We find that the optimal position size for bulls and bears — flt and f
s
t , respec-
tively — implies that speculators hold open positions (either long or short) in
foreign exchange, only if they expect a positive return in excess of some min-
imum value, which we call an individual uncertainty premium and denote by
upit. Thus, the optimal position size for bulls and bears, f
l
t = f
l
t (r˜
l
t+1 − uplt )
and f st = f
s
t (r˜
s
t+1−upst), is increasing in the conditional forecast of the return
and decreasing in the uncertainty premium.
Our solution for the optimal position size also shows that the individ-
ual uncertainty premia can be interpreted as compensation for potential
losses: individual uncertainty premia depend positively on the degree of loss
aversion and negatively on agents’ expected losses. This result implies that
the optimal positions of bulls and bears, flt = f
l
t (s˜
l
t+1, st, fpt, l
l
t ) and f
s
t =
17R+t+1 = Rt+1I(Rt+1 > 0) and R−t+1 = Rt+1I(Rt+1 < 0), where I(.) is an indicator
function.
18Note that the expected losses of bulls and bears — llt and lst — are both negative magni-
tudes. We will refer to decreases in llt and lst as increases in the magnitudes of the potential
losses.
19In contemplating models with heterogeneous expectations, the behavioral economics
literature has relied solely on the assumption of risk aversion to obtain what is called limits
to arbitrage (e.g., see Barberis and Thaler, 2002). Our analysis with dynamic prospect
theory shows that limits to speculation can also be achieved solely on the basis of dynamic
loss aversion.
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f st (s˜
s
t+1, st, fpt, l
s
t), are decreasing in the magnitudes of the potential losses.
In section 3.3, we set the total of long positions equal to the total of
short positions to derive UAUIP. We find that this equilibrium relationship
is characterized by an equality between the market’s expected return (or av-
erage opinion) on foreign exchange, r˜t+1 = r˜lt+1 + r˜
s
t+1, and the aggregate
uncertainty premium, upt = uplt − upst . The equilibrium uncertainty pre-
mium, then, is the uncertainty premium of bulls in excess of the uncertainty
premium of bears. The upward-sloping 45o line in figure 1 is a locus of such
equilibrium points in the model.
One of the implications of UAUIP is that the sign of the equilibrium
premium on foreign exchange is determined by the relative magnitudes of
r˜lt+1 and r˜
s
t+1, i.e., in equilibrium, if bulls (bears) dominate in determining
the sign of the average opinion — r˜lt+1 > −r˜st+1(r˜lt+1 < −r˜st+1) — then a balance
between long and short positions in the market obtains when bulls (bears)
require a higher minimum return for holding open positions — uplt > up
s
t
(uplt < up
s
t). Figure 1 assumes bears dominate in terms of the average
opinion at the initial equilibrium point (point A), i.e., r˜t+1 = upt < 0.
The flt and f
s
t curves in figure 2 plot at time t the total of long positions
held by bulls and the total of short positions held by bears as negative and
positive functions of the exchange rate, st, respectively. The intersection of
these two curves at point A, then, determines the equilibrium exchange rate.
The equilibrium at point A in figures 1 and 2 is defined for a given set of
forecasting models, i.e., for given P it(St+1|X it , θit)’s.
The logic behind the slopes and shifts of the flt and f
s
t curves is cen-
tral to our analysis and its implications for the behavior of the uncertainty
premium over time. Both shifts in and movements along these curves are
associated with revisions of forecasting models. In our IKF framework, the
process of revising forecasts does not just entail a mechanical updating of
the means of agents’s conditional distributions, but it is also compatible with
a simultaneous revision of the higher moments of these distributions;.Under
IKF revisions of forecasts, in general, involve revisions of the forecasting
models.20
20The standard REH approach to the updating of forecasts is to model this process as a
passive recomputation of conditional forecasts triggered by new realizations of the variables
in agents’ information sets. The IKF framework not only allows for such conventional,
information-driven, updating, but it is also compatible with revisions of forecasts that
involve changes in the composition of the set of variables included in the model and/or
revisions of the values of the model parameters.
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In section 4, we use the IKF framework to model revisions of the individ-
ual conditional probability distributions and examine the implications of this
process for the movements of the equilibrium uncertainty premium over time.
To illustrate our analysis, consider an autonomous (for a given st) upward
revision of the mean of the conditional distribution for a representative bull,
s˜lt+1, assuming that fpt is given.
21 The impact of this revision is shown as a
rightward shift of the flt curve in figure 2. The movement of the equilibrium
from point A to point B can be decomposed into two steps; the shift of f lt
from A to B’, for a given st, and the resulting movement of st, along the f lt
and f st curves to the new equilibrium at point B.
In section 4.1, we build on a profound — yet neglected — idea put forth by
Keynes (1936) to model the first-step shift in flt (s˜
l
t+1, st, l
l
t ). We assume that
an autonomous increase in the bulls’ conditional forecast s˜lt+1 not only causes
r˜lt+1 to rise, but it also causes l
l
t to fall (i.e. its magnitude rises) because of
a gap eﬀect: a bull’s (bear’s) expected loss depends negatively (positively)
on the divergence, or gap, between his conditional forecast and the perceived
historical benchmark level, which we denote by s˜hbit .
To understand the logic behind the gap eﬀect, assume for concreteness
that st > s˜
hbi
t for all agents, i.e., all agents believe that the foreign currency is
overvalued relative to the perceived historical benchmark. As bulls increase
s˜lt+1, they therefore expect a greater overvaluation of the foreign currency.
This upward revision can occur despite the assumed belief, on the part of
all agents, that the asset price will eventually adjust back to its perceived
benchmark level. The forecasting problem all agents face, therefore, is that
the asset price may move persistently away from its perceived benchmark
over an extended time period, prior to “reverting” back. The gap eﬀect
implies that as bulls raise their expectation of an overvaluation, they become
more fearful of a movement back to the historical benchmark. This, then,
leads bulls to increase their assessment of the magnitude of the potential
losses.
As bulls raise their assessments of the potential losses, they simultane-
ously raise their uncertainty premia, uplt . Thus, in general, r˜
l
t+1 − uplt may
rise or fall. However, we assume that although agents’ loss aversion limits
their willingness to risk capital, the degree of loss aversion is not so high
21We explore the movement of the equlibrium premium following a change in fpt in
Frydman and Goldberg (2002), where we find that our IKF model of the uncertainty
premium sheds new light on the forward-premium anomaly.
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as to prevent agents from changing the size of their positions in the same
direction as the change in their conditional forecasts, i.e., r˜lt+1 − uplt rises
above r˜st+1 − upst . This increase in the expected excess return leads bulls to
increase their long positions, as depicted by the shift of f lt from point A to
B’ in figure 2. At the initial exchange rate, then, the total of long positions
is greater than the total of short positions, causing st to rise.
In section 4.2, we model the second step movement of st from its initial
equilibrium level to its new equilibrium level at point B. An increase in st
leads to revisions of the distribution of next period’s return, Rt+1, for both
bulls and bears. In general, these revisions involve not only changes in the
means, r˜lt+1 and r˜
s
t+1, but also changes in l
l
t and l
s
t , and, thus, changes in
uplt and up
s
t . The slopes of the f
l
t and f
s
t curves in figure 2 follow from two
qualitative assumptions on the updating of s˜t+1 as a consequence of changes
in st.22 Under these assumptions, the rise in st causes r˜lt+1 − uplt to fall and
r˜st+1 − upst to rise, thereby working to reestablish equilibrium and a balance
between the total of long and short positions.
The equilibrium movements of r˜t+1 and upt are shown in figure 1 as
a movement from point A to point B. The figure assumes that the initial
first-step increase in s˜lt+1 (and therefore in r˜
l
t+1) was large enough so that,
after the equilibrium movement in st, the average opinion not only increases,
but its algebraic sign changes from negative to positive. Equilibrium, then,
requires that the aggregate uncertainty premium not only increase, but that
its algebraic sign also change from negative to positive, as the dominant
weight in the average opinion shifts from bears to bulls. Thus, our IKF model
of the uncertainty premium provides a simple explanation of the sign reversals
in foreign exchange premia that have been observed in the literature.23
The shifts in figures 1 and 2 also illustrate another implication of our
IKF model of the equilibrium uncertainty premium, which we refer to as
an aggregate gap eﬀect: upt increases with the expected gap from benchmark
levels,gapt = s˜t+1− s˜hbt .
22The first assumption is that
ds˜it+1
dst
< 1, which we need for stability of the momentary
equilibrium. The second qualitative assumption is
ds˜it+1
dst
> 0.We refer to this assumption
as an average opinion eﬀect. We motivate this assumption by drawing on the extensive
evidence in the behavioral economics literature that this assumption captures the behavior
of agents in the real world markets.
23See Lewis (1995) and Mark and Woo (1998) for the inability of standard REH models
to explain the observed sign reversals in foreign exchange premia.
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In section 4.3, we formulate a model of foreign exchange premia with
a house-money eﬀect and dynamic loss aversion, and show that this model
implies a negative relationship between the equilibrium uncertainty premium
and the expected gap from benchmark levels.
Section 5 provides empirical evidence in support of our IKF model with
an aggregate gap eﬀect. Figure 3 illustrates this new empirical finding well.
The figure plots six-month averages of upt, using the MMSI data, and the
expected gap, in a sample that spans the period from January 1983 through
December 1996.24 Although not a statistical test, the time plots are rather
suggestive that the relationship between upt and gapt is indeed positive.
Formal tests reveal that such a positive relationship is supported at very
high significance levels. Thus, we are able to reject the IKF model with
a house money eﬀect in favor of the IKF model with a gap eﬀect;.but see
footnote 10 above.
Section 6, which concludes the paper, discusses the relative merits of the
qualitative IKF and the quantitative REH approaches to the modeling of the
forecasting process in a world of imperfect knowledge.
3 Modeling the Decisions of Speculators at a
Point in Time
In this section we model the decisions of speculators in the foreign exchange
market under the assumptions of a diversity of individual forecasting models
and a heterogeneity of expectations. The introduction of heterogeneous ex-
pectations raises a problem that has been noted in behavioral-finance models
such as Delong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990a,b) and Shleifer and
Summers (1990): heterogeneity of forecasts and unlimited short selling re-
quire limits to speculation in order to obtain a well-defined equilibrium.25
24To obtain a measure ofgapt, we used the Big Mac PPP exchange rate reported in the
April 1993 edition of the Economist (which was 2.02), and then used inflation diﬀerentials
(based on CPI series from the IFS data bank) to estimate the PPP exchange rate both
forwards and backwards.
25A detailed examination of this problem is outside the scope of this paper. In Frydman
and Goldberg (2003b) we examine this problem within the context of the monetary models
of Dornbusch (1976) and Frankel (1979). We find that under heterogeneous expectations,
equilibrium in this class of models is no longer characterized by uncovered interest rate
parity.
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To solve this problem, the literature assumes that all speculators are risk
averse.26 We show in this section that limits to speculation can also be
obtained solely on the basis of prospect theory, which assumes that utility
functions are specified over the change in wealth, provided that the original
formulation of prospect theory is extended to the dynamic setting of financial
market speculation.
We begin with a description of the speculative decision in the foreign
exchange market under the standard assumption of perfect capital mobility.
At every point in time, both domestic and foreign speculators operating in the
foreign exchange market face a decision on whether to take a long or a short
position in foreign exchange. The assumption of perfect capital mobility
implies that only pure speculation matters, i.e., the activity of borrowing
capital so as to take simultaneously a short position in the borrowed currency
and a long position of equal size in the other currency.27
The ex post value of the return on a long position of one unit of foreign
exchange from time t to t+1, which we denote by rt+1, can be approximated
as follows:
rt+1 = (st+1 − st)− fpt (1)
Since −rt+1 is the ex post return from a short position of one unit of foreign
exchange, the decision of speculator i on whether to take a long or short
position in foreign exchange depends on his individual forecast at time t of
rt+1 in equation (1), r˜it+1.
If agent i were risk neutral, then he would take a long (short) position in
foreign exchange if r˜it+1 > 0 (r˜
i
t+1 < 0). In developing our model, we maintain
that at every point in time bulls and bears coexist in the market. Since the
forecasts of bulls and bears are necessarily of the opposite sign, the coexis-
tence of bulls and bears in the market necessarily implies a heterogeneity of
expectations.
26This result, that risk aversion leads to limits to arbitrage, is viewed as one of the main
pillars of behavioral finance (see Shleifer and Summers, 1990 and Barberis and Thaler,
2002). Since in a world of imperfect knowledge no speculator knows the “true fundamental
value,” we will use the term limits to speculation.
27Perfect capital mobility implies that pure speculative flows are infinitely elastic with
respect to the expected return on foreign exchange, eliminating the need to consider capital
flows originating from all other sources. It is based on the assumption of no barriers to
the international flow of capital, including no constraints on short selling. See Mundell
(1963) and Dornbusch (1976).
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3.1 Diversity of Forecasting Models
To develop our model, we need a formal characterization of the creative
process by which individual agents form their forecasts of rt+1. In general,
this process can be conceptualized as involving three basic steps:
• Adescription of the information set on which individual agents
form forecasts
The information set used by agent i at time t, denoted by X it , can be di-
vided into two basic subsets: a subset, X i,ft , consisting of variables cap-
turing information contained in fundamental factors (e.g. money sup-
ply or GDP growth) and a subset, X i,nft , consisting of non-fundamental
factors (e.g., those based on technical trading or market psychology)
considered relevant by agent i for forecasting the return to foreign
currency speculation. We note that the fundamental and/or non-
fundamental subsets of the information set are indexed by t and thus
the composition of either of these subsets is not restricted to remain
unchanged over time. This reflects the recognition that, in general,
individual agents may use diﬀerent sets of variables in forming their
forecasts at diﬀerent points in time.28 To streamline the exposition, we
treat all of the variables in X it as random variables, even though some
of these (particularly those in X i,nft ) may be qualitative in nature or
constants, and thus, may have degenerate marginal probability distri-
butions. In what follows, we assume that the information set for each
agent includes St and FPt.29
• A formal representation of the individual forecasting model
To form forecasts in a world of imperfect knowledge, individual agents
need to form assessments of the likelihood of potential realizations of
next period’s return, Rt+1. They arrive at such judgements on the
28For empirical evidence that agents use diﬀerent variables in their forecast functions at
diﬀerent points in time see Goldberg and Frydman (1996b,2001). See also Lyons (2001)
and the survey studies of Cheung and Chinn (2001) and Cheung et al (1999).
29This plausible assumption simplifies our notation considerably, in that it allows us to
express, in a particularly simple way, the conditional distribution of Rt+1 , PR,it , in terms
of the conditional distribution of St+1: PR,it (Rt+1|X it , θit) = Pit(St+1|X it , θit) − St − FPt.
Note that if either St and/or FPt were excluded from X it , we would need separate notation
for the conditional distributions for Rt+1 and St+1. Because keeping the two distributions
distinct would not aﬀect any of our conclusions, we ignore this possibility.
14
basis of the time-t realizations of the variables they choose to include
in their information set, and by some formal or informal procedure they
choose to map these realizations into their assessments of the likelihood
of potential values of Rt+1. One way to model this forecasting process,
which we follow in this paper, is to represent an individual forecasting
model of Rt+1 in terms of a conditional probability distribution over
St+1.30 We denote this latter distribution by P it(St+1|X it , θit), where θit
is a set of parameters of this conditional distribution.
• An individual (conditional) forecast
An individual forecast of Rt+1 is based on the mean of the conditional
distribution P it(St+1|X it , θit), evaluated at the time-t realizations of the
variables in X it , denoted by xit, and the time-t values of the parameters
θit:
r˜it+1 = EPit (St+1|xit, θit)− st − fpt = s˜it+1 − st − fpt (2)
Beyond providing a formal representation of the individual forecasting
models, the foregoing formulation highlights the two potential sources of the
heterogeneity of expectations: 1) a diversity among the individual condi-
tional distributions, P it(.|.); and/or 2) diﬀerences in the measurement of the
variables in some common information set, Xt, on which forecasts are based,
for example, as in the Lucas (1973) island model.
We note that our formulation of individual forecasting models subsumes
the REH-based expectation function as a special case: under the REH, all
agents form expectations based on the common, sometimes referred to as
the “objective”, probability distribution, Pt. Thus, to rationalize the hetero-
geneity of expectations, conventional REH models must appeal to diﬀerences
in the measurement of the variables appearing in the common forecasting
model.31
In contrast, heterogeneity in the IKF framework can be rationalized by
appealing to the implications of the postulate of economic rationality in a
30The formal representation of the individual forecasting models as conditional expecta-
tions is analytically convenient. The analysis in this paper can be extended to incorporate
one of the elements of prospect theory: that instead of attaching probabilities to prospects,
agents attach decision weights to them. See Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky
and Kahneman (1991,1992). Also see footnote 33 below for a remark on this point.
31See Lyons (2001) for such an approach in the foreign exchange market. Although an
extensive discussion of the diﬃculties involved with such rationalizations is outside the
scope of this paper, we return to some of these problems in section 5.
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world of imperfect knowledge. For example, Frydman (1982) formally shows
that rational agents, who do not pass up opportunities for gain, will not,
in general, use a common model and/or rely on the same information when
forming forecasts in a world of imperfect knowledge. Thus, a heterogeneity
of forecasting models as well as diﬀerences in the information used by agents
can be linked to the rationality of agents coping with the fact that they must
forecast on the basis of imperfect knowledge.
3.2 Position Size at a Point in Time: Dynamic Prospect
Theory for a Given Set of Individual Forecasting
Models
In this subsection we build on the seminal formulation of prospect theory
due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
Kahneman and Tversky developed prospect theory to explain the often gross
inconsistencies between the actual choices of individuals who are faced with
risky or uncertain outcomes and the predictions implied by the conventional
expected utility hypothesis. The typical choice problems considered by Kah-
neman and Tversky were static, in that they involved a rich variety of mon-
etary gambles involving choices between exogenously fixed outcomes with
respect to the potential gains and losses. The large literature in psychol-
ogy and economics has presented striking evidence that in such situations,
prospect theory is able to explain the observed choices of individual agents
much more successfully than the conventional expected utility hypothesis.
Although gambles with exogenously fixed outcomes characterize a large
class of decision problems under uncertainty, such gambles do not character-
ize speculation in financial markets. Outcomes from financial speculation are
endogenous, in the sense that, given speculators’ forecasting models of next
period’s return, they must decide on the amount of capital to place at risk.
This decision will then determine the overall potential gains and losses.
In applying prospect theory to speculative decisions, however, there is one
special case — the case of homogeneous expectations — in which the decision
of how much to gamble when a profit opportunity is perceived need not be
modeled. With homogeneous expectations, there is a unique price at which
agents are willing to hold a given supply and this equilibrium level is indepen-
dent of the size of speculative positions outside of equilibrium. Since recent
applications of prospect theory to the modeling of asset markets all make use
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of the standard representative-agent assumption (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler,
1995, Barberis, Huang and Santos, 2001 and Barberis and Huang, 2001),
they are able to sidestep the problem of modeling the size of speculative
positions.
In this paper, we assume a heterogeneity of forecasting models and ex-
pectations. In this setting, we find that the original, static formulation of
prospect theory does not provide a basis for modeling the decision of how
much to gamble, given the individual forecasting models. This consideration
leads us to our assumption of dynamic loss aversion, which imposes a condi-
tion on the curvature of the utility function over gains relative to its curvature
over losses. In this section, we make use of a particularly simple version of
dynamic loss aversion, which connects the degree of loss aversion to position
size, thereby making preferences dynamic.32 We show that with dynamic loss
aversion, loss-averse agents limit the size of their gambles when an expected
profit opportunity arises. This result leads to our new equilibrium condition
for the foreign exchange market,
3.2.1 Dynamic Prospect Theory
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1991, pp. 1039-1040), prospect theory
implies that risky prospects are evaluated by a value function that has the
following three basic characteristics:33
• Reference Dependence
“The carriers of value are gains and losses defined relative to a reference
point and the eﬀect of the level of wealth on utility is assumed to be
32In applying prospect theory to financial markets, Barberis, Huang and Santos ( 2001)
and Barberis and Huang (2001) also make preferences dynamic by combining the assump-
tion of loss aversion with the house-money eﬀect. As we show in this subsection, such
a specification of dynamic preferences would not by itself limit the size of speculative
positions. However, Barberis, Huang and Santos ( 2001) and Barberis and Huang (2001)
embed their version of dynamic preferences under loss aversion into a general utility func-
tion that is also defined over the level of consumption. Since this part of the utility
function is assumed to be concave, these studies would in principle be able to obtain lim-
its to speculation based on the standard assumption of risk aversion if the assumption of
homogenous expectations were dropped.
33Although Kahneman and Tversky “restrict” their original discussion to prospects with
so-called “objective or standard probabilities” they note that “the theory can also be...
[applied] to the typical situations of choice, where the probabilities of outcomes are not
explicitly given (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 263).”
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relatively negligible.”
• Loss Aversion
The disutility from losses exceeds the utility from gains of the same
magnitude. As they put it, “losses loom larger than corresponding
gains.”
• Diminishing Sensitivity
“The marginal value of both gains and losses decreases with their size”
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) extend the notion of loss aversion in an in-
sightful and important way by observing that “when decision makers are
loss-averse they will be more willing to take risks if they evaluate their perfor-
mance...infrequently (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995, p. 75).” This leads Benartzi
and Thaler to a notion they call “myopic loss aversion,” which combines loss
aversion with frequent evaluation. We follow Benartzi and Thaler by adopt-
ing the assumption of myopic loss aversion as one of the key assumptions
of our approach. In what follows we assume that speculators on foreign
exchange evaluate their performance every period.
The distinction between gains and losses plays a central role in prospect
theory and so we need expressions for agents’ forecasts of the potential gains
and losses from speculation. Using the standard decomposition of Rt+1, we
have
r˜it+1 = EPit (Rt+1|xit, θit) = EPit (R+t+1|xit, θit) +EPit (R−t+1|xit, θit) = r˜
+,i
t+1 + r˜
−,i
t+1
(3)
Recalling, that for a bull (bear), positive realizations of Rt+1 imply gains
(losses) and negative (positive) realizations imply losses (gains) on an open
position equal to one unit of foreign exchange, we can express the total
expected gain and loss of a bull and a bear as follows:
Remark 1 Let gilt (g
is
t ) and l
il
t (l
is
t ) denote the expected gain and loss at
time t of a bull (bear) who has a one-unit long (short) position in foreign
exchange. Also, let f i denote the number of units of foreign exchange that
speculator i has decided to gamble, to be referred to as the size of speculator
i’s position. Then the total expected gain and the total expected loss on a
position of size f it ≥ 0 are34
34Note that although we use upper case G and L to denote the total expected gains and
losses, it is clear from (4)-(7) that G and L are not random variables but rather the values
of the total expected gains and losses evaluated at time t.
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for a bull:
Gilt = g
il
t f
il
t = r˜
+,i
t+1f
il
t = EPit (R
+
t+1|xit, θit)f ilt ≥ 0 (4)
Lilt = l
il
t f
il
t = r˜
−,i
t+1f
il
t = EPit (R
−
t+1|xit, θit)f ilt ≤ 0 (5)
and for a bear:
Gist = g
is
t f
is
t = −r˜
−,i
t+1f
is
t = −EPit (R
−
t+1|xit, θit)f ist ≥ 0 (6)
List = l
is
t f
is
t = −r˜
+,i
t+1f
is
t = −EPit (R
+
t+1|xit, θit)f ist ≤ 0 (7)
We can now specify the preferences of a loss-averse speculator as a func-
tion of his expected gain and loss. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) proposed
the following specific functional form for the utility function of loss-averse
agents,
V i =
½
G
iβ
t
−λi (−Lit)
α (8)
where the parameter λi captures the degree of loss aversion, and β and α
determine the curvature of the utility function over total gains and losses,
respectively. A value of λi greater than 1 implies loss aversion on the part
of agents, namely that losses loom larger than corresponding gains. Based
on experimental evidence involving one-shot, fixed gambles, Kahneman and
Tversky (1992) estimated the value of λi to be in excess of 2.35 Since the
curvature of the utility function over potential gains relative to its curvature
over potential losses plays no role in static decision problems, Kahneman and
Tversky (1992) set β = α. Under this assumption, Kahneman and Tversky
found β = α = .88, implying that V i is concave over gains and convex over
losses.
In applying prospect theory to financial markets, Barberis, Huang and
Santos (2001) and Barberis and Huang (2001) use a simpler, linear version
of the utility function in (8):
V i(Git, L
i
t) = g
i
tf
i
t .+ λ
ilitf
i
t = v
i
gtf
i
t + v
i
ltf
i
t = V
i
gt + V
i
lt (9)
where we express the utility function for a loss averse speculator in terms of
the expected gain and loss from a one-unit position in foreign exchange, git
35This result has been found in a wide range of experimental contexts. See Barberis
and Thaler (2002) and references therein.
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and lit, multiplied by the size of the position, f
i
t . Thus,
¡
vigt + v
i
lt
¢
denotes
the expected utility from an open position of one unit and
¡
V igt + V
i
lt
¢
is the
expected utility on a position of size f it .
The utility function in (9) captures loss aversion, but ignores the as-
sumption of diminishing sensitivity. Barberis and Thaler argue that such a
simplification is justified “because it is diﬃcult to incorporate all these fea-
tures into a fully dynamic framework; but also, it is based on Benartzi and
Thaler’s observation that it is mainly loss aversion that drives their results
(Barberis and Thaler, 2002, p. 26).”
A utility function that is linear in total gains and losses, however, does
not give rise to limits to speculation. Note that once a speculator formulates
his forecasting model at time t and observes the realizations of the variables
in his information set, the values of the conditional forecast, r˜it+1, and the
expected gain and loss, git and l
i
t, are pre-determined from the point of view
of determining the optimal size of his position. Let foit denote the position
size of speculator i that maximizes his utility. Thus, if speculator i believes
that git + λ
ilit < 0, he will be unwilling to take an open position in foreign
exchange of any size (i.e., foit = 0), whereas if g
i
t + λ
ilit > 0, he will want to
take an open position of unlimited size (i.e., foit =∞).
Thus, to justify limits to speculation, solely on the basis of prospect
theory, the utility function of loss-averse agents must be concave in f it , i.e.,
the disutility of losses must grow faster than the utility of gains as the position
size increases. Given the utility function in (8), this requires that β < α,
i.e., the degree of concavity of V i over gains must be larger than its degree
of convexity over losses. This leads to the following extension of prospect
theory to the dynamic setting of financial-market speculation:
• Dynamic Loss Aversion
The disutility of losses grows faster than the utility of gains as the
magnitudes of losses and gains increase proportionately.
Remark 2 We note that the assumption of dynamic loss aversion is in the
spirit of the original formulation of prospect theory: as the magnitudes of
losses and gains increase proportionately, the total change in losses is as-
sumed to loom larger in utility than the total change in gains.
To incorporate the assumption of dynamic loss aversion in a convenient
way, we retain the additive form of the utility function in (9) with respect
20
to the total expected gain and loss. We also ignore the third postulate of
prospect theory, but unlike Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) and Barberis
and Huang (2001), we develop a specification that is linear in the expected
gain and concave in the expected loss.36 Such a specification follows from the
assumption that there exists a positive relationship between the disutility of
losses on a unit position, vilt , which Kahneman and Tversky (1979) assumed
to be a constant, and position size. The idea behind this assumption is a
natural one; agents’ fear of potential losses grows as position size grows.
To keep the analysis simple, without aﬀecting any of our conclusions, we
assume that
vilt = λ
ilit = λ
i
1l
i
t − λi2f it , 1 < λi < λmax (10)
where now the degree of loss aversion is a function of position size, i.e.,
λi = λi1 + λ
i
2
f it
(−lit)
, and λmax is some constant.37 Plugging (10) into (9) yields
the following expression for the expected total utility on an open position of
size f it held by a loss-averse agent:
V it = g
i
tf
i
t + λ
i
1l
i
tf
i
t − λi2(f it )2 (11)
The assumption of dynamic loss aversion, which implies concavity over
f it , ensures that there is a finite position size that maximizes speculator i’s
utility. Diﬀerentiating V it with respect to position size, and setting the result
equal to zero, yields the following expression for foit :
foit =
1
2λi2
(git + λ
i
1l
i
t) (12)
Note that a negative value for foit occurs for speculator i only when
git + λ
i
1l
i
t < 0. In this case, speculator i expects that an open position in
foreign exchange will not increase his utility and therefore decides to stay
out of the market, i.e., foit = 0. Given that λ
i
1 > 1, the speculator will stay
out of the market even when git + l
i
t > 0, i.e., although speculator i may
36All we need is a concave function in f it . Thus, our main results, although more
complicated, would be unchanged if we were to maintain diminishing sensitivity over both
gains and losses, as in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and assumed that the curvature of
V was greater over gains.
37Having made the degree of loss aversion a function of position size, we need to restrict
the parameters λi1 and λi2 in (10) so that all values of λi lie within a range between 1
and λmax. This can be done easily under mild assumptions. See Frydman and Goldberg
(2003b) for a derivation of such conditions.
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expect to earn a positive return from an open position in foreign exchange,
the size of this return may not be large enough to compensate him for his
greater sensitivity to losses. The solution in (12) implies, therefore, that a
positive foit is necessarily associated with g
i
t + l
i
t > 0. This reasoning leads
to one of the major conclusions of our analysis:
Conclusion 1 All dynamically loss-averse speculators require an expected
return in excess of some individually determined positive value in order to
take open positions in foreign exchange.
In the next section, we connect this minimum expected return to the
uncertainty faced by agents concerning the timing of countermovements in
the exchange rate back to its historical benchmark level. We refer to this
minimum expected return, therefore, as an individual uncertainty premium,
upit. To obtain a simple expression for up
i
t, we rewrite (12) as follows:
foit =
(git + l
i
t) + (λ1 − 1) lit
2λ2
=
1
2λ2
£
I(typei)r˜it+1 − upit
¤
(13)
where I(typei) is an indicator function such that if typei = bull, I = 1, and
if typei = bear, I = −1. From (13), the minimum expected return agent i
needs to take an open position is:
upit =
¡
1− λi1
¢
lit > 0 (14)
The expression in (14) shows that the individual uncertainty premium
can be written as a simple function of agent i’s expected loss and degree of
loss aversion as captured by the parameter λi1 > 1. Agent i will be willing to
take an open position in foreign exchange only when his conditional forecast
of next period’s return is large enough to compensate him for his greater
sensitivity to losses (i.e., r˜it+1 > up
i
t).
It is useful to compare the speculative decision under dynamic loss aver-
sion with the decision under risk neutrality. With risk neutrality, a r˜it+1 > 0
( r˜it+1 < 0) leads agent i to take a long (short) position in foreign exchange of
unlimited size. But with dynamic loss aversion, agent i limits his willingness
to commit capital to the speculative game because his fear of losses grows
as position size grows. The assumption of dynamic loss aversion, therefore,
leads to limits to speculation. Moreover, as we noted earlier, the fear of losses
may be large enough so that even though a speculator may expect a positive
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excess return, he may decide, nonetheless, to stay out of the market. This is
never the case under risk neutrality.
We are now ready to use our solution of the speculative decision under
dynamic prospect theory, and its implications for uncertainty premia and
limits to speculation, to derive the momentary equilibrium condition in the
foreign exchange market.
3.2.2 Momentary Equilibrium under Dynamic Prospect Theory
and Diversity of Forecasting Models: Uncertainty Adjusted
Uncovered Interest Parity
In deriving the momentary equilibrium condition for the foreign exchange
market with heterogeneous expectations, we adopt an insight due to Keynes.
Keynes argued in his analysis of speculation in the market for long-term debt
that
The market price will be fixed at the point at which the sales
of the “bears” and the purchases of the “bulls” are balanced
(Keynes, 1936, p. 170).
In terms of our model of speculation, the “sales of bears” translates into the
cumulative total of short positions in foreign exchange and the “purchases
of the bulls” translates into the cumulative total of long positions in foreign
exchange. Aggregating (13) for bulls yields
nlX
i
f
oil
t = w
nlX
i
wil r˜ilt+1 − w
nlX
i
wil [1− λil1 ]lilt = w
¡
r˜lt+1 − uplt
¢
(15)
where
w =
1Pnl+ns
i
1
2λi2
and 0 < wil =
1
2λil2
1
w
< 1 and
nl+nsX
i
wi = 1 (16)
Analogously for bears
nsX
i
f
ois
t = −w
nsX
i
wis r˜ist+1 − w
nsX
i
wis[1− λis1 ]lilt = w
¡
−r˜st+1 − upst
¢
(17)
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where wis is defined in a way similar to (16). The weights wil and wis have
straightforward interpretations. Note that these weights are negative func-
tions of the degree of loss aversion as measured by the parameter λi2. From
(13), however, higher values of λi2, ceteris paribus, imply smaller open posi-
tions in foreign exchange. Thus, the aggregation weights used in expressions
(15) and (17) reflect the fact that as λi2 rises, agent i’s forecast, r˜
i
t+1, and
uncertainty premium, upit, will have less of an influence on the exchange
rate, and therefore less of an influence on the average expected return and
uncertainty premium.
Let
r˜t+1 = r˜
l
t+1 + r˜
s
t+1 =
nl+nsX
i
wir˜it+1 and upt = up
l
t − upst (18)
then the equality between the cumulative total of long positions in (15) and
short positions in (17), and thus the condition for momentary equilibrium,
can be expressed as follows:
r˜lt+1 + r˜
s
t+1 = up
l
t − upst ⇐⇒ r˜t+1 = upt (19)
The terms uplt and up
s
t are weighted sums that move one-for-one with the
weighted averages of the uncertainty premia of the group of bulls and bears,
respectively. These terms represent the minimum expected return that will
induce the group of bulls and the group of bears to take open positions in
foreign exchange. Thus, equilibrium in the foreign exchange market obtains
when on average, the expected return of the bulls, in excess of the minimum
expected return needed to take long positions, r˜lt+1−uplt , equals the expected
return of bears, in excess of the minimum expected return needed to take
short positions, r˜st+1 − upst .
As with UIP, then, equation (19) says that equilibrium in the foreign
exchange market occurs when in the aggregate, the expected return on long
positions equals the expected return on short positions, but only after these
expected returns have been adjusted for agents’ greater sensitivity to poten-
tial losses. We refer to this equilibrium condition, therefore, as uncertainty
adjusted uncovered interest rate parity (UAUIP).
The UAUIP condition shows that the algebraic sign of upt is determined
by the algebraic sign of the average opinion or “market” expectation of Rt+1,
i.e., r˜t+1. If, for example, the average opinion is positive, so that the ex-
pectation of bulls dominates that of bears (r˜lt+1 > −r˜st+1), then equilibrium
requires that bulls are either more “fearful” of losses or contemplate larger
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potential losses relative to bears, i.e., uplt > up
s
t . It is this higher expected
loss that allows the market to reach a balance between the total of long and
short positions. This leads to one of the major conclusions of our analysis:
Conclusion 2 The algebraic sign of the equilibrium uncertainty premium,
upt, will change whenever the dominant weight behind the average opinion
shifts between bulls and bears.
4 Revisions of Individual Forecasting Models
and the Movement of the Uncertainty Pre-
mium Over Time: A Qualitative Approach
We have shown that dynamic prospect theory provides a basis for modeling
part of the decision problem faced by financial-market speculators, namely
how much capital to gamble at each point in time. The analysis led to an
equilibrium condition for the foreign exchange market in which the market’s
expected return on open positions in foreign exchange is, in general, nonzero,
i.e., upt 6= 0. However, the equilibrium defined in (19) is only momentary,
because it is defined for a given set of forecasting models, and, therefore, for
given values of the aggregate forecast and the expected losses.
As individual agents revise their forecasts and their expected losses, they
will, according to (13), adjust the size of their long and short positions.
These adjustments of the speculative positions disturb the balance between
the weight of bulls and bears and move the momentary equilibrium exchange
rate and the equilibrium uncertainty premium.
The main objective of this section is to model the evolution of the equi-
librium uncertainty premium, upt, over time.38 Because upt in (19) is a
weighted average of agents’ expected losses, we need to model the evolution
of these expected losses as individual forecasting models are revised. To this
end, we follow the IKF approach and develop qualitative restrictions on the
38For the use of the IKF approach to model the movement of the momentary equlibrium
exchange rate, see Frydman and Goldberg (2003a). In that paper, we examined the widely
noted tendency of floating exchange rates to exhibit long swings (e.g., see Dornbusch and
Frankel, 1988). We found that under imperfect knowledge and behaviorally plausible
qualitative conditions on the revisons of forecasting models, a monetary model implied
a tendency for the exchange rate to move persistently away from PPP over an extended
time period.
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formulation of the individual forecasting models and their revisions. In the
next subsection, we build on an idea, put forth by Keynes (1936), and for-
mulate qualitative conditions that link revisions of forecasts with revisions
of expected losses.
4.1 The Gap Eﬀect
In discussing the question of why an agent might hold cash rather than
interest-bearing bonds, Keynes argued that
[the demand for cash] will not have a definitive quantitative re-
lation to a given rate of interest of r; what matters is not the
absolute level of r but the degree of its divergence from what is
considered a fairly safe level of r, having regard to those calcu-
lations of probability which are being relied on (Keynes [1936,
p.201].
Furthermore, in what is apparently the first explicit reference to loss aver-
sion in the economics literature, Keynes connected agents’ assessments of
expected losses to the divergence of the rate of interest from its “fairly safe”
level. As he put it,
Unless reasons are believed to exist why future experience will
be very diﬀerent from past experience, a ...rate of interest [much
lower than a historical safe rate], leaves more to fear than to
hope, and oﬀers, at the same time, a running yield which is only
suﬃcient to oﬀset a very small measure of fear (Keynes [1936,
p.202]).
What is remarkable about these passages is that Keynes not only related
expected losses to the degree of divergence of the rate of interest from a “fairly
safe” benchmark rate based on historical experience, but also postulated that
if the current rate of interest is too low (i.e. too far away from the benchmark
rate), the potential “fear” of a capital loss will exceed “the running yield”.
Thus, Keynes surmised that the relationship between a “measure of fear”
and “the running yield” is key to understanding the dynamic behavior of
interest rates and, more generally, to the returns from speculation in asset
markets.
26
A benchmark is, of course, specific to each asset market. Its value each
period is determined by individual agents and so, in general, will diﬀer across
agents. However, there are a few general characteristics of a benchmark that
are already explicit in Keynes’ remarks cited above and that are important
for our analysis.
1. Although assessments of the benchmark value at each time t may diﬀer
across individual agents, the range over which these individual assess-
ments diﬀer should be smaller (often substantially so) than the range
over which the observed asset price varies. For example, this would
be the case for individual benchmarks based on averages of historical
data.
2. This notion of a benchmark will play an important role in speculative
decisions if the historical evidence suggests that: a) asset prices tend to
move persistently away from their historical benchmarks for substantial
periods of time; and b) asset prices eventually revert, at unpredictable
moments in time, back to their historical benchmark values, and often
shoot through these levels.39
3. Individual speculators recognize the historical record on long swings in
asset prices and believe that this evidence is used by other speculators
operating in the markets.
Based on the foregoing considerations, we now formulate the gap eﬀect.
Let the expected gap for an individual agent be defined as the diﬀerence
between his conditional forecast of the uncertain, payoﬀ-relevant asset price
and his assessment of the historical benchmark value for this price. Then,
the gap eﬀect can be stated as follows:
• The Gap Eﬀect
As an individual agent increases his assessment of the expected gap,
he simultaneously increases (decreases) his assessment of the expected
loss if he is a bull (bear).
39For evidence that exchange rates exhibit long swings that revolve around historical
benchmark levels see the references contained in footnote 54. For the bond market see
Bec and Anders (2002) and for the stock market see Campbell and Shiller (1998), and
references therein.
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In terms of the foreign exchange market, the expected gap is as follows:gapit = s˜it+1 − s˜hbit (20)
This definition allows us to formulate the gap eﬀect as the following qualita-
tive conditions on the revisions of the forecasting and an associated revisions
of the expected losses of bulls and bears:
∂lilt
∂gapilt <0 and ∂l
is
t
∂gapist >0 (21)
To see the logic behind the gap eﬀect, suppose that st > s˜
hbi
t for all
agents, i.e., all agents believe that the foreign currency is overvalued relative
to its perceived historical benchmark level. Also, suppose that all agents
revise their assessments of the expected gap up, leading agents to believe in
a greater overvaluation. This upward revision in the expected gap can occur
despite the assumed belief, on the part of all agents, that the asset price will
eventually begin reverting back to its perceived benchmark level.
The forecasting problem all agents face, therefore, is that the asset price
may move persistently away from its perceived benchmark over an extended
time period prior to “reverting” back. The gap eﬀect implies that as the bulls
raise their assessments of the overvaluation, they become less confident that
the movement away from the benchmark will continue in the future. This
causes them to revise up their assessments of the magnitude of the potential
losses, i.e. the −lilt ’s increase. The bears, on the other hand, are assumed to
become more confident that the countermovement will occur, and this causes
them to lower their assessments of the magnitude of the potential losses, i.e.
the −list ’s fall.40
The gap conditions in (21) pre-suppose that the expected loss on a unit
position in foreign exchange is a function of the expected gap for all agents.
Before we examine the implications of these gap conditions, we need to show
that a well-specified function relating lit andgapit, and its derivatives, can be
defined.
A revision of the individual forecast r˜it+1 = EPit (St+1|xit, θit)− st− fpt can
be viewed formally as involving either one or both of the following two types
of changes:
40Although the term “benchmark” might suggest a similarity between the gap eﬀect
and the house-money eﬀect of Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001 and Barberis and Huang
(2001), as is clear from our discussion that the benchmark measure we have in mind is, in
fact, very diﬀerent.
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1. A revision of the individual forecasting model, P it(St+1|X it , θit), which
may involve: a) a revision of the values of the parameter vector θit, but
no change in the composition of variables included in the information
set; or b) the dropping of variables from or the adding of variables to
the information set, i.e., a change in the composition of X it .
2. Revisions that are triggered by new the realizations of St and FPt
and/or the other variables in the information set, and that leave fore-
casting model unchanged.
To construct a function relating the expected loss to the expected gap,
define a random variable it such that
Rt+1 = EPit (Rt+1|X it , θit) + it = S˜t+1 − St − FPt + it, where,
S˜t+1 = EPit (St+1|X it , θit) and EPit (it|X it , θit) = 0 (22)
The analyses for a bull and a bear are analogous, and so we conduct our
analysis for a bull only. Evaluating the expectation of Rt+1 in (22), condi-
tional on a given realization xit yields:
r˜t+1 = EPit (St+1|xit, θit)− st − fpt = s˜it+1 − st − fpt (23)
Recalling that R−t+1 represents potential losses for a bull, equation (22)
readily implies the following relationship between the expected loss on a unit
position, lit, and s˜
i
t+1, x
i
t and θ
i
t:
lit = l
i
t(r˜
i
t+1, s˜
hbi
t , x
i
t, θ
i
t) = EPit (R
−
t+1|xit, θit) = EPit (Rt+1I(Rt+1 < 0)|xit, θit)
= EPit [(r˜
i
t+1 + 
i
t)I(Rt+1 < 0)|xit, θit] (24)
The realizations of the variables in xit enter the l
i
t function in (24) through
its eﬀect on r˜it+1 = r˜
i
t+1(x
i
t, θ
i
t) and moments of 
i
t.
In this paper, we focus on the relationship between lit and gapit. We as-
sume, therefore, that the eﬀects of changes in the realizations of the variables
in xit on l
i
t, other than s˜
hbi
t , are always dominated by the gap eﬀects through
r˜it+1.
41 To simplify the exposition, we ignore the eﬀects of changes in xit —
through the moments of it— on l
i
t, other than s˜
hbi
t . We list s˜
hbi
t as a separate
41More formally, we assume that the sign( ∂l
i
t
∂r˜it+1
dr˜it+1
dx
ik
t
+
∂lit
∂x
ik
t
) = sign( ∂l
i
t
∂r˜it+1
dr˜it+1
dx
ik
t
) for all
k = 1, ...Kit , where Kit is the number of variables in agent i’s information set at time t.
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argument of lit, because the definition of the gap in (20), and the gap condi-
tions in (21),.imply an additional eﬀect of s˜hbit on l
i
t. This allows us to write
lit = l
i
t(r˜
i
t+1, s˜
hbi
t , θ
i
t) = l
i
t(s˜
i
t+1, s˜
hbi
t , st, fpt).
The formulation in (24) also clarifies, formally, the term “model revision”
in the IKF framework: such a revision involves not only an updating of the
value of the first moment of P it(St+1|X it , θit), i.e. r˜it+1(xit, θit) but, in general,
it also involves a revision of the other moments of the distribution of it. In
fact, as we shall show next, the gap eﬀects in (21) necessarily entail revisions
of the higher moments of P it (.|.).
Because s˜it and s˜
hbi
t play a similar role in (20) though with opposite signs,
we assume, in this paper, that s˜hbit is a constant. This assumption allows us
to focus on the gap eﬀects, and their implications, arising from changes in
the individual s˜it’s.
To consider both autonomous and endogenous changes in s˜it, we express
this conditional forecast as a sum of an autonomous component, s˜ait+1(z
i
t),
and an endogenous component, s˜eit+1(st, z
i
t), where z
i
t is a subset of x
i
t that
does contain st, as follows:42
s˜it+1 = s˜
ai
t+1 + s˜
ei
t+1 (25)
To define the derivatives of lit in (24) with respect to s˜
i
t+1, st and fpt,
without a loss of generality, we consider a revision of the forecasting model,
P it (.|.), accompanying an increase in s˜ait+1 for a bull. The definition in (23) im-
plies that this revision of the expected gap leads to a one-for-one “rightward
shift” of the conditional forecast of the next period’s return, r˜it+1. Further-
more, we need to check whether such a shift in r˜it+1 would be consistent with
the gap conditions in (21), which we impose on the revision of the bull’s
expected loss.43
We begin by showing that there is a large class of forecast functions,
including the standard REH-based formulations, for which the gap conditions
do not hold. This straightforward result plays a key role in rendering our
42It should be noted, that although zit does not contain st, Zit does, in general, contain
fundamental variables that may be correlated with the exchange rate. Thus, the IKF
framework explicitly allows for the forecasting models that include fundamental variables.
For example, see Frydman and Goldberg (2003a) for the IKF-based analysis of long swings
relying on fundamentals, in contrast to the non-fundamentals factors, such such sunspots,
market psychology, etc.
43The authors are grateful to Mike Woodford for insightful comments and suggestions
on this point.
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model testable: it implies that the gap conditions can be rejected by the
data.
The following proposition, which is proved in the appendix, shows that
in order for the lit(s˜
i
t+1, s˜
hbi
t , st, fpt) functions to satisfy the gap conditions,
revisions of s˜it+1 must be accompanied by simultaneous revisions of the higher
moments of the individual conditional distribution of Rt+1.
Proposition 1 Suppose that agent i changes his conditional forecast of the
exchange rate, s˜it+1, either because he revises the parameter vector θ
i
t or be-
cause of new realizations of the information vector xit. Moreover, suppose that
while s˜it+1 is revised, all other moments of the distribution P
i
t (St+1|X it , θit) re-
main unchanged. Then the gap conditions in (21) will not hold, irrespective
of whether agent i is a bull or a bear.
Given that the individual forecasting models are represented as individ-
ual conditional probability distributions, proposition 1 can be interpreted as
follows: in general, for the gap conditions to be satisfied, a revision by an
agent of his forecasting model, P it(Rt+1|X it , θit) = .P it (St+1|X it , θit)−St−FPt,
would have to involve not just the updating of the mean (i.e. the value of
his conditional forecast), but would also have to entail revisions of the other
moments of his forecasting model. In particular, the gap conditions would be
violated if the forecast revisions were to be triggered solely — without changes
in the higher moments of an agent’s distribution— because of new realizations
of the variables in X it .
Proposition 1 also implies that a ceteris paribus change in either st,or fpt
— aﬀecting solely the value of the conditional forecast, r˜it+1, while keeping the
higher moments unchanged — would violate the gap conditions in (21). Such
ceteris paribus shifts define the partial derivatives of lit(r˜
i
t+1, s˜
hbi
t , x
i
t, θ
i
t) with
respect to st and fpt. The following corollary to proposition 1. collects our
results on the partial derivatives of of the function lit.
Corollary 1 The gap conditions in (21) and proposition 1 imply the follow-
ing signs on the partial derivatives for a bull:
∂lilt
∂s˜ilt+1
< 0
∂lilt
∂st
< 0
∂lilt
∂fpt
< 0 (26)
and a bear
∂list
∂s˜ist+1
> 0
∂list
∂st
> 0
∂list
∂fpt
> 0 (27)
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Proposition 1 also implies that as the gap between s˜it+1 and the histori-
cal benchmark changes, the associated revision of the individual forecasting
model should entail changes in the “size” of the “tails” of the subjective dis-
tribution. This conclusion, which is proved in the appendix, is summarized
in the following proposition. To save space we state this proposition only for
an increases in the value of a bull’s forecast:
Proposition 2 Suppose a bull revises upward his forecast of next period’s
exchange rate (or return), causing an increase in gapilt+1. If this updating
is consistent with the gap condition in (21), then beyond the updating of
the conditional mean, this agent must also update the other moments of his
distribution in a way that leads to an increase of his expected loss.
Proposition 2 has potentially important implications for the modeling
of the forecasting process in financial markets. For if the gap eﬀect is an
empirically relevant hypothesis concerning the revisions of agents’ forecasting
models and conditional forecasts, then diﬀerent approaches to the modeling
of expectations could be assessed from the point of view of their compatibility
with the qualitative restrictions in (21).
Consider the REH approach from this point of view. Recall that aside
from infrequent changes in policy, the updating of REH forecasts arises as a
consequence of the arrival of new information. Proposition 2 implies that for
the updating of the REH-based forecasts to be consistent with the gap ef-
fect, the higher moments of the so-called “objective” probability distribution
would have to be specific functions of its conditional mean. A discussion of
the compatibility of the REH with our gap eﬀect is outside of the scope of
this paper.44
In the next subsection, we employ the gap eﬀect to examine the movement
of the equilibrium uncertainty premium, upt, over time. Our analysis of
this movement will demonstrate that qualitative conditions on individual
forecasting do lead to testable implications from IKF-based models.
44However, even before the compatibilty of the REH with a gap eﬀect can be consid-
ered, the prior question of the very meaning of the “objective distribution” needs to be
addressed. See the concluding remarks.
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4.2 The Behavior of the Equilibrium Uncertainty Pre-
mium Over Time
In this subsection, we derive the main testable implication of our model,
that the equilibrium uncertainty premium varies positively with an aggregate
measure of the expected gap, denoted by gapt, i.e., duptdgapt > 0. We conduct
our analysis for a given fpt.45
The UAUIP condition in (19) shows that upt is a weighted average of
the individual expected losses and degrees of loss aversion computed over all
agents, where in (21) we have assumed these individual expected losses to
be functions of the perceived expected gaps. If we were prepared to assume
homogeneity of preferences and forecasting models then these individual gap
eﬀects would carry over to the aggregate relationship between upt and the
aggregate (or market) expected gap, i.e., a rise in the market expected gap
would necessarily lead to a rise in upt. In this case, all speculative positions
would be zero in equilibrium (i.e., foit = 0 for all agents), as r˜t+1 would
exactly equal the uncertainty premium required by each agent, upt.46
Thus, to obtain an equilibrium in which speculators do hold non-zero open
positions (i.e., in which bulls and bears exist), the homogeneity assumption
must be dropped. But with heterogeneity, the individual gap eﬀects, by
themselves, no longer ensure a gap eﬀect in the aggregate. In this section
we derive suﬃcient conditions on the aggregation under which the individual
gap eﬀects do imply an aggregate gap eﬀect. We find that these conditions
are rather mild.
The equilibrium uncertainty premium in (19), and the aggregate gap, can
be written as follows:
upt = upt =
nl+nsX
i
wiI(typei)
¡
1− λi1
¢
lit(s˜
i
t+1, st, s˜
hb
t ) (28)
gapt = nl+nsX
i
wigapit = nl+nsX
i
wis˜it+1 −
nl+nsX
i
wis˜hbit = s˜t+1 − s˜hbt (29)
45We examine changes in fpt in Frydman and Goldberg (2002), where we find that our
IKF-based model of the uncertainty premium sheds new light on the forward-premium
anomaly.
46This no-trade result in equilibirum is a common feature of all asset market models
with homogeneous expectations.
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where the weights are the same as in (19).
To derive the implication of a change in the aggregate expected gap on
the equilibrium uncertainty premium, we compute the total diﬀerential of
equation (28). To this end, we use (25) and obtain:
ds˜it+1 = ds˜
ai
t+1 + β
i
tdst (30)
where βit =
∂s˜eit+1
∂st . Aggregating (30) yields the following:
ds˜t+1 =
nl+nsX
i
wids˜ait+1 +
nl+nsX
i
wiβitdst = ds˜
a
t+1 + βtdst (31)
The total diﬀerential of upt in (28) results in:
dupt =
nl+nsX
i
wiI(typei)
¡
1− λi1
¢ · ∂lit
∂s˜it
ds˜ait+1 + (1− βt) ξitdst
¸
(32)
where ξit =
µ
∂lit
∂st
+
∂lit
∂s˜it
βit
¶
(1−βt)
. The UAUIP condition in (19) implies the following
equilibrium movements:
dst =
1
(1− βt)
¡
ds˜at+1 − dupt
¢
(33)
where we have used the aggregate expression in (31). Plugging equation (33)
into equation (32) yields the expression for the equilibrium movement of upt:
dupt =
Pnl+ns
i w
iI(typei)
¡
1− λi1
¢ h ∂lit
∂s˜it
ds˜ait+1 + ξ
i
tds˜
a
t+1
i
1 +
Pnl+ns
i w
iI(typei)
¡
1− λi1
¢
ξit
(34)
To determine the sign of duptdgapt , we examine the sign of duptds˜at+1 . Note, that
except for the βit’s and βt, the signs of the parameters of (34) all follow
from our gap conditions and proposition (1) in (26) and (27), and from
the assumption of dynamic loss aversion. The βit’s capture the endogenous
influence of changes in st on the one-period ahead conditional forecasts, s˜it+1,
and, through an indirect gap eﬀect, on the higher moments. In general, an
individual βit can be positive or negative.
There is, however, much evidence in the behavioral economics literature
suggesting that, at short horizons, and at the aggregate level, βt is positive.
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For example, the use of technical trading rules, or “charts,” — many of which
extrapolate past price trends — is widely known to be prevalent in all finan-
cial markets. In a study of the London foreign exchange market, Allen and
Taylor (1990) and Taylor and Allen (1992) find that approximately ninety
percent of respondents reported using some technical rules at the short hori-
zons when forming expectations.47 There is also much experimental evidence
that speculators in simulated markets react positively to price trends (e.g.,
see Andreassen and Kraus, 1990, and De Bondt, 1993). Moreover, the many
studies on investor underreaction and overreaction to news also indicate that
trend-following behavior at the shorter horizons is widespread in speculative
markets.48
The foregoing discussion suggests rather strongly that, although a nega-
tive βit may characterize the behavior of some speculators, setting βt > 0 is a
reasonable assumption. Moreover, we assume that if βit < 0 for some agents,
then this negative eﬀect on s˜it+1 is limited, so that I(type
i)
³
∂lit
∂st +
∂lit
∂s˜it
βit
´
< 0
for all agents. We call these two assumptions on βt and the β
i
t’s an average
opinion eﬀect, because it is reminiscent of Keynes’ arguments that changing
positions in a way that is consistent with the average opinion is pervasive in
speculative markets.49
In what follows, we also assume that βt < 1, which is required for the
stability of the model.50. This assumption of stability, together with an
average opinion eﬀect, implies that the denominator in (34) is positive and
I(typei)ξi < 0 for all agents. Thus, the direction of change of the equilibrium
uncertainty premium, given a revision in s˜at+1 (and thus revisions in the
s˜ait+1’s), will be determined by the expression in the numerator of (34). Note,
that under βt > 0, if
dupt
ds˜at+1
> 0, the equilibrium movements of upt and gapt
are such that duptdgapt > 0, i.e., if the expected gap increases initially because of
a rise in s˜at+1, then the endogenous increase in s˜t+1 will preserve the positive
47For early studies on the use of technical trading systems and trend-following behavior
and their implications for asset price dynamics, see Schulmeister (1987) and Soros (1987).
See also the study of the Hong Kong foreign exchange market in Lui and Mole (1998).
48For studies on underreaction see Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991) and Chan,
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1997), and references therein, and for studies on overreaction
see De Bondt and Thaler (1985,1987). See also Shiller (2000).
49See, for example, the passages in Keynes (1936), p. 156.
50It can be easily shown that if st is displaced from its momentary equilibium point,
then βt < 1 is required for the momentary equilibirum to be reestablished.
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change ingapt.
4.2.1 An Aggregate Gap Eﬀect
To gain insight into the conditions needed for an aggregate gap eﬀect, con-
sider a one-time increase in s˜at+1, which arises due one-time changes in some
or all of the s˜ait+1’s. Since the analysis for a decrease in s˜
a
t+1 is analogous, we
conduct our analysis for an increase only. The following lemma is useful in
uncovering the diﬃculty posed by aggregation:
Lemma 1 If the increase in s˜at+1 arises solely because a subset of the bulls
and bears raise their forecasts of St+1 (i.e., no agent lowers his forecast),
then the equilibrium uncertainty premium necessarily increases, given the
assumptions on individual updating in (26) and (27) and an average opinion
eﬀect.
Proof. With ds˜ait+1 > 0 for all agents, the assumptions on individual
updating in (26) and (27) and the average opinion eﬀect imply that for bullsPnl
i w
il
¡
1− λil1
¢ h ∂lilt
∂s˜ilt
ds˜
ail
t+1 + ξ
il
t ds˜
a
t+1
i
= duplt > 0, and bears
Pns
i w
is
¡
1− λis1
¢h
− ∂l
is
t
∂s˜ist
ds˜
ais
t+1 − ξist ds˜at+1
i
= −dupst > 0. Since upt = uplt − upst , we have
dupt
ds˜at+1
> 0 and a positive relationship between the equilibrium uncertainty
premium and the market expected gap.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward. As the bulls (bears)
raise their assessments of the expected gap, causing s˜at+1 to rise, they become
more (less) nervous and simultaneously raise (lower) their assessments of the
potential losses, i.e., the
¡
1− λil1
¢ ∂lilt
∂s˜ilt
ds˜
ail
t+1 and −
¡
1− λis1
¢ ∂list
∂s˜ist
ds˜
ais
t+1 terms
are all positive. The increase in s˜at+1 also results in an increase in st, and this
works to raise (lower) the uncertainty premia of bulls (bears), i.e., the ξilt ds˜
a
t+1
and −ξist ds˜at+1 terms are all positive.51 Thus, the rise ingapt necessarily leads
to an increase in upt.
51It is possible for st to fall when s˜t+1 rises, if the increase in s˜t+1 leads to a larger
increase in upt, i.e., bulls, for example, become so much more nervous about potential
losses when they increase their forecasts that they reduce their long positions. But in
this case note that upt increases, thereby giving rise to an even larger gap eﬀect than
if st had risen. In what follows we ignore this case and assume that although agents’
speculation is tempered by their greater sensitivity to potential losses, the increase in
bull (bear) i’s uncertainty premium resulting from a revision of s˜it+1 up (down) is not so
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The diﬃculty emerges when, in general, the forecasts of some of the bulls
and bears increase while for others their forecasts decrease. It is clear from
Lemma 1 that the uncertainty premia of the bulls (bears) who revise down
their forecasts may fall (rise) in this case. This would occur if the updating
of the expected loss due to the fall in s˜ait+1, which works to lower up
il
t and
−upist , outweighed the positive eﬀect due to the rise in st. And, the λi1’s and
∂list
∂s˜ist
’s for the group of bulls and bears who revise down their forecasts may
be so much larger than for the group who revise their forecasts up, that in
the aggregate upt falls when s˜at+1 rises.
The following lemma, which is proved in the appendix, is useful in illu-
minating suﬃcient conditions that ensure an aggregate gap eﬀect:
Lemma 2 Let I(typei)(
1−λi1)
C
∂lit
∂s˜it
= ρi > 0 and I(typei)(
1−λi1)
C ξ
i
t = γ
i > 0,
where C denotes the expression in the denominator of (34). Then if ρi = ρ
for all agents, then duptds˜at+1 > 0.
The intuition behind lemma 2 is that with ρi = ρ for all agents, the
weights placed on a given change in ds˜ait+1 for the group of bulls and bears
who revise their forecasts up (call this group, group 1) are necessarily larger
then for the group of bulls and bears who revise their forecasts down (call
this group, group 2), i.e.,
µ
ρ+ γi1
ds˜at+1
ds˜
ai1
t+1
¶
>
µ
ρ+ γi2
ds˜at+1
ds˜
ai2
t+1
¶
, where i1 and i2
denote values for groups 1 and 2, respectively. This follows because with
group 1 (group 2) speculators raising (lowering) their forecasts,
ds˜at+1
ds˜
ai1
t+1
> 0
and
ds˜at+1
ds˜
ai2
t+1
< 0, i.e., the influence on individual expected losses from the
endogenous change in s˜t+1 always works to increase the weights for group 1
agents and lower the weights for group 2 agents.
This reasoning indicates that an aggregate gap eﬀect will follow even if the
ρi’s diﬀer across agents, as long as the degree of this heterogeneity remains
within some bounds that depend on the magnitudes of the γi’s. This leads to
the following proposition, which states a suﬃcient condition for an aggregate
gap (see the appendix for the proof):
large as to prevent agent i from increasing his open position. Formally, df
oi
t
ds˜it+1
= I(type) +¡
λi1 − 1
¢ ∂lit
∂s˜it+1
> 0 for all i.
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Proposition 3 If the following condition holds
max(ρi)−min(ρi) < min(γi)min
1
µ
ds˜at+1
ds˜ait+1
¶
−max(γi)max
2
µ
ds˜at+1
ds˜ait+1
¶
(35)
then duptds˜at+1 > 0, where max(.) and min(.) denote the maximum and minimum
values of the respective parameters over all agents and min1 and max2 refer
to the maximum and minimum over agents in groups 1 and 2.
Proposition 3 shows that an aggregate gap eﬀect necessarily follows from the
assumptions on individual expected losses in (26) and (27), and the average
opinion eﬀect, as long as the dispersion of the individual gap eﬀects remain
within some bounds that depend on the magnitudes of the γi’s. Note that
min(γi)min1
³
ds˜at+1
ds˜ait+1
´
> 0 and −max(γi)max2
³
ds˜at+1
ds˜ait+1
´
> 0, implying that an
increase in the individual γi’s allows for a greater dispersion of the ρi’s. The
reasoning here follows directly from Lemma 2: greater γi values imply greater
eﬀects on the individual expected losses from changes in st, which work to
increase up
il
t and −up
is
t irrespective of whether the bull or bear is in group
1 or 2.
Proposition 3 shows that the set of individual parameter values implying
an aggregate gap eﬀect is non-empty and potentially quite large. Thus, the
condition in Proposition 3 is compatible with heterogeneity in how individual
agents revise their forecasting models. Whether the distributions of the ρi’s
and γi’s are in fact consistent with this condition is an empirical question.
Our empirical findings in the next section, which provide evidence of an
aggregate gap eﬀect, indicate that our IKE-based model of the uncertainty
premium with the aggregation condition in (35) is consistent with the data.
This analysis leads to the following conclusion:
Conclusion 3 If the gap between the aggregate forecast and the perceived his-
torical benchmark increases (decreases) — and the gap conditions in (26) and
(27), the heterogeneity condition in (35) and an average opinion eﬀect hold —
then the equilibrium uncertainty premium necessarily increases (decreases).
4.3 The Behavior of the Equilibrium Premium under
a House-Money Eﬀect
In this subsection we examine the implications of the house-money eﬀect used
in Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) and Barberis and Huang (2001) for our
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IKE-based model of returns. To this end, we formalize a house-money eﬀect
in the context of our model of foreign exchange speculation. We show that a
house money eﬀect does not lead to limits to speculation and a well defined
equilibrium in a model based solely on prospect theory. We must continue
to assume, therefore, dynamic loss aversion on the individual level. As such,
the resulting formulation of our model possesses dynamic preferences from
two sources, i.e., changes in position size and reference dependence.
As before, it is the revisions of forecasts that gives rise to the dynamics
in the model and movements in the momentary equilibrium. But to high-
light the implications of a house-money eﬀect, we drop the assumption of
an individual gap eﬀect. We find that while a house-money eﬀect generates
additional volatility in returns, it also implies a negative relationship between
the individual premia on foreign exchange speculation and the expected gap.
This negative relationship stands in sharp contrast to the positive relation-
ship obtained in the model when the assumption of a gap eﬀect is imposed.
To formalize a house-money eﬀect, we adopt a simple formulation of the
utility function, analogous to (9), that incorporates the idea that the degree
of loss aversion depends on prior investment performance. To this end, let
cprit denote cumulative portfolio gains or losses for an agent between some
reference point in time, chosen by the agent at time t. The following utility
function embodies a house-money eﬀect:
V it = g
i
tf
i
t + (δ
i
0 − δi1cprit)litf it (36)
where 1 < δi0 < λ
max and, analogously to section 3, δi1 > 0 is bounded from
above in such a way as to insure the degree of loss aversion lies within a finite
range.
We note that since V it in (36) is linear in f
i
t , a house-money eﬀect alone
is not suﬃcient to limit the size of agents’ positions under heterogenous
expectations. Thus, we must incorporate our assumption of dynamic loss
aversion into the utility function. In a way analogous to (11) in section 3, we
modify (36) as follows:
V it = g
i
tf
i
t + (δ
i
0 − δi1cprit)litf it − λi2(f it )2 (37)
Setting the derivative of (37) with respect to f it equal to zero yields:
foit =
1
2λi2
£
I(i)r˜it+1 − prit
¤
(38)
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where
prit = (1− δi0 + δi1cprit)lit (39)
denotes the expected premium on foreign exchange.
To analyze the movements of prit over time — using the qualitative method-
ology of the IKF framework — we must specify the qualitative conditions on
updating for the case in which the gap conditions in (21) do not hold. The
violations of these conditions and partial derivatives of llt with respect to st,
in the corollary 1 result in
∂lilt
∂s˜ilt+1
> 0,
∂lilt
∂st
< 0 (40)
∂list
∂s˜ist+1
< 0,
∂list
∂st
> 0 (41)
Moreover, proposition 1 implies that for both bulls and bears:
∂lit
∂s˜it+1
= − ∂l
i
t
∂st
(42)
Totally diﬀerentiating (39) and using (42) yields:
dprit = (1− δi0 + δi1cprit)
∂lit
∂gapit+1 [ds˜it+1 − ds] + δi1d(cprit)lit (43)
Let bit > 0 and a
i
t > 0 be defined as follows:
δi1
d(cprit)
ds
lit = −I(i)bit and (1− δi0 + δi1cprit)
∂lit
∂gapit+1 = −I(i)ait
and note that if agent i is a bull (bear) d(cpr
i
t)
ds is positive (negative). We use
this notation to rewrite prit as follows:
prit = I(i)a
i
t(st − s˜it+1)− I(i)bitst (44)
To determine the equilibrium st under the representative-agent assump-
tion, we omit the superscript i and use the UAUIP condition in (19):
r˜t+1 = s˜t+1 − st − fpt = prt (45)
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Without loss of generality, suppose expectations are such that r˜t+1 > 0.
Equations (44) and (45) imply the following expression for the equilibrium
exchange rate:
st =
1 + at
1 + at − bt
s˜t+1 −
1
1 + at − bt
fpt (46)
Totally diﬀerentiating (46) and setting dfpt = 0, implies that, for our example
of an increase in s˜t+1, dst > 0. This, in turn, implies the following equilibrium
movement in prt:
dprt = ds˜t+1 − dst < 0⇒
dprt
∂est+1 = dprt∂gapt+1 < 0 (47)
Equation (47) reveals a negative relationship between the representative
agent’s premium and the expected gap when an agent’s preferences embody
a house-money eﬀect.52 Thus, a house-money eﬀect and a gap eﬀect lead
to opposite conclusions concerning the relationship between the premium on
foreign exchange speculation and the expected gap. In the next section we
present empirical evidence of a positive relationship, thereby lending support
to our IKF model with a gap eﬀect.
5 Some Empirical Evidence
The preceding two sections developed a model of the expected excess return
on foreign exchange based on IKE and dynamic prospect theory. One of
the main implications of our model is that movements in the equilibrium
uncertainty premium should be positively related to movements in the ex-
pected gap. In this section we present some empirical evidence in support
of this prediction. To this end we utilize the survey data from MMSI, which
allows us to construct monthly observations of the median four-week fore-
cast of the German mark-U.S. dollar exchange rate from a group of foreign
exchange market participants.53 Our data on spot and forward rates, which
52Having shown this on the individual level, we do not examine the aggregation problem.
Even if the individual eﬀect were to be overturned through aggregation, this aggregation
result would not serve as a sensible foundation for the development of macroeconomic
relationships based on well-specified microfoundations.
53For a more detailed description of the data see Frankel and Froot (1987). From
January 1983 through December 1984, MMSI provides only two-week forecasts.
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Table 1: OLS Regression
Uncertainty Premium and the Expected Gap
Constant 0.857
(0.954)
gapt 1.334∗∗∗
(0.222)
Adjusted R2=.394 DW Statistic=2.15
Standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity) are in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗denotes significance with a p-value of .01
are bid-asked averages, comes from the WEFA data base.54
Table 1 reports the results of an OLS regression of upt ongapt. To address
the problem of serial correlation and possible stochastic trends we added to
the regression lags of the dependent and independent variables (these co-
eﬃcients are not shown).55 Diagnostic tests revealed that two lags were
suﬃcient. The results show that the expected gap is highly significant and
positively related to the expected excess return on foreign exchange (in this
case the U.S. dollar), as predicted by our IKE-based model of upt.
The results reported in Table 1 should be treated with some caution.
This is because we would expect the relationship between upt and gapt to
be nonlinear: agents most likely place little weight on small deviations from
PPP values, whereas large deviations will be given a relatively large weight.
Also, with IKE, we would expect the OLS regression to be temporally un-
stable, as the correlation between upt and gapt shifts over time. One way
54See footnote 24 for our measure of gapt. For evidence that PPP does serve as a
historical benchmark for the foreign exchange market, see the cointegration studies of
Juselius (1995) and Cheung and Lai (1993), among others, as well as studies on the long-
horizon predictability of PPP and monetary fundamentals (e.g., Mark (1995) and Mark
and Sul (2001). See also Obstfeld [1995] and references therein. We note, however, that
although it may be plausible to use PPP as a proxy for the benchmark level for many
exchange rates, this does not imply that the PPP level is a long-run equilibrium in the
sense of being the rate at which the foreign exchange market “settles”.
55See Juselius and Hendry (2000) on the validity on using OLS standard errors for
inference with unit-root variables when lagged values of the dependent and independent
variables are included in the regression.
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Table 2
Contingency Table Analysis
4upt > 0 4upt < 0
4gapt > 0 43 25
4gapt < 0 30 51
to handle the changing nature of the relationship between upt andgapt is to
make use of a non-parametric procedure such as contingency-table analysis.
Contingency-table analysis provides a way to test the qualitative relation-
ship, while allowing for the exact form of the quantitative relationship to
change over time.
Table 2 presents the contingency table results. The diagonal (oﬀ-diagonal)
cells in the table denote the number of observations for which the changes
in upt and gapt (denoted 4upt and 4gapt, respectively) were in the same
(opposite) direction. Since the number of observations along the diagonal are
larger than the oﬀ-diagonal, the results show that the relationship between
upt and gapt is a positive one. A χ2 statistic of 10.15 indicates that this
positive relationship is significant at less than the .01 level.
6 Concluding Remarks: IKF vs. REH
The preceding section presented evidence that our IKF-based model of the
uncertainty premium with a gap eﬀect is consistent with the empirical record.
The numerous and largely unsuccessful attempts under the REH to explain
the behavior of excess returns on foreign exchange as the equilibrium com-
pensation for risk, suggests that our IKF framework provides a superior al-
ternative to the REH approach from a purely empirical, positivist standpoint
(Friedman, 1953). Moreover, because quantitative rules, such as those un-
der the REH, are in general inconsistent with individual rationality, the IKF
framework’s replacement of such rules with qualitative assumptions on the
modeling of agents’ forecasting behavior, speaks in favor of IKF on theoretical
grounds (Frydman and Goldberg, 2003a, and references therein). Finally, the
assumption that agents must formulate and revise their forecasting models on
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the basis of imperfect knowledge seems to be uncontroversial on behavioral
grounds.
Despite serious empirical, theoretical and behavioral problems besetting
the REH approach, we surmise that many of our colleagues will be reluc-
tant to consider, let alone embrace, our view that the modeling of the fore-
casting process on the basis of imperfect knowledge is required in order to
understand the dynamics of exchange rates as well as other asset prices.
This reluctance may stem from the acceptance by most macroeconomists
of Lucas’s methodological dictum to “beware of theorists bearing free para-
meters (Sargent, 1999, p. 73).” At a minimum, our IKF approach insists
that macroeconomic models should contain “free” parameters arising from
agents’ forecasting models. Furthermore, despite the usual claims that “re-
solving empirical diﬃculties by adding new parameters always works (Lucas,
2003a, p.8),” our empirical testing of one IKF model of the premium with
a gap eﬀect against another IKF model with a house-money eﬀect clearly
shows that models with free parameters can be rejected by the data. Al-
though both models relied on the qualitative updating of forecasting models
to generate dynamics, they produced unambiguous and opposite predictions
concerning the qualitative relationship between the equilibrium uncertainty
premium and the expected gap.
In contrast to the IKF, the REH approach presumes that the economist
who models agents’ behavior can specify precisely the individual forecast-
ing models. This assumption begs the question as to which of the potential
(extant and yet to be invented) models of macroeconomic phenomena the
economist should attribute to the agents. The standard REH application
implicitly assumes that agents forecast on the basis of the model formulated
by the economist who happens to be analyzing the behavior of macroeco-
nomic aggregates. This procedure rigidly ties agents’ forecasting models to
the economist’s own model and, by assumption, eliminates free parameters
arising from the forecasting process in macroeconomic analysis.
By banning expectations from playing an active role in macroeconomic
analysis, the REH has severely hampered the ability of macroeconomists to
provide explanations of the dynamics of asset markets and other phenomena
in which expectations play an active and important role. Macroeconomic fun-
damentals included in economists’ models vary much less than asset returns;
thus, models that rigidly tie expectations to these fundamentals will continue
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to stumble in explaining the observed behavior of asset prices.56 More gen-
erally, empirically relevant models of macroeconomic phenomena in which
expectations play a key role are very likely to involve free parameters arising
from agents’ forecasting models.57
Paradoxically, the rigidity of the REH approach, something commonly
viewed as its key virtue, has forced economists working in the REH tradi-
tion to introduce new forms of utility functions to explain anomalies in asset
markets. However, models based on new forms of utility functions, for ex-
ample the house-money eﬀect, may appear to be empirically relevant when
based on the narrow criteria of matching moments (see Barberis, Huang and
Santos, 2002), and yet as we showed in section 5, may be inconsistent with
the actual behavior of asset returns over time.58
Beyond the diﬃculties in providing empirically relevant explanations,
the REH approach suﬀers from fundamental problems on purely theoreti-
cal grounds. The key issue is its compatibility with the basic postulate of
rationality in economics: Under what conditions would it be rational, in the
56A related point concerns the observed temporal instability of empirical models of
asset price dynamics (e.g., in the foreign exchange market see Golderg and Frydman,
1996a,b,2001). Since this instability is too pervasive to be attributed to changes in policy
rules, the updating of expectations needs to be introduced into the analysis.
57It is worth noting that Lucas has recently commented on diﬃculties experienced by
REH-based macroeconomics. See Lucas (2003a,b). For example, commenting on progress
since the REH was added to the seminal macroeconomic models in Phelps (1969), Lucas
(2003b, p.140) acknowledged that,
New frameworks–contracts, monopolistic compretition–are introduced,
motivated by the inability of earlier theory to resolve this diﬃculty [of ex-
plaining persistent real responses to nominal shocks], but the problem of
persistence has proved to be persistent itself...Ever since the January, 1969,
conference that Ned Phelps invited us to, the 14 authors of the Phelps vol-
ume have been apologetic about the fact that we couldn’t resolve these issues.
After watching so many of our talented colleagues struggling with them over
the 30 years since, maybe we shouldn’t feel so bad.
58Another important diﬃculty with the REH is that it often leads to tight connections
between relationships in asset and other markets. As Lucas (2003a, p.8) points out,
formulating new utility functions to resolve the equity premium puzzle “often [raises] more
problems ” for explanations in other markets. In contrast, the IKF approach does not suﬀer
from such inherent diﬃculties. By according the forecasting process an active role, the
IKF framework substantially weakens the link between the asset and other markets. We
build on this point in Frydman, Goldberg and Juselius (2003), where we show that the
IKF approach leads to a resolution of the PPP-puzzle (Rogoﬀ, 1996).
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sense of not passing up profit opportunities, for an agent to use the model
written down by the economist, as is assumed under the conventional use of
the REH? Summarizing earlier arguments concerning epistemological prob-
lems with the REH (see footnote 3 for references), Sargent (1993) has stated
the answer to this question in a particularly striking way. As he put it,
rational expectations is an equilibrium concept that at best de-
scribes how the system might eventually behave if the system
will ever settle down to a situation in which all of the agents have
solved their “scientific problems” (Sargent, 1993, p. 23).
Therefore, in a world in which the scientific problem has not been solved,
rational agents in pursuit of profit opportunities will, in general, search and
adopt forecasting models andmethods that diﬀer from the quantitative model
that the REH theorist attributes to agents.
This conclusion has an immediate implication for the compatibility of
the basic rationality postulate in economics with the REH-based represen-
tative agent approach. This approach abstracts from both the individual
diﬀerences in preferences and the diversity of individual forecasting models.
Homogeneous preferences might be rationalized as a necessary approximation
to make the macroeconomic models tractable; this assumption does not, in
general, conflict with economic rationality. However, even if we acknowledge
considerable diﬃculties in solving aggregation problems, we cannot appeal
to tractability to justify the REH as an approximation of the forecasting
models used by heterogenous agents limited by imperfect knowledge. There-
fore, unless the macroeconomist is prepared to abandon the basic economic
rationality postulate, the REH cannot be treated as an approximate repre-
sentation of the expectations formed by rational agents in a world in which
“agents have [not] solved their scientific problems.”
Of course, if one were prepared to assume that the “scientific problem”
has been solved, the incompatibility of the REH approach with the ratio-
nality postulate in economics would disappear. Such attribution of “perfect
knowledge” to individual agents operating in the real world markets might
be behind a general belief that the REH is the solution to the problem of
modeling forecasting process of rational agents. The appeal of the REH has
been also based on behavioral considerations. As Sargent put it
The idea of rational expectations is sometimes explained infor-
mally by saying that it reflects a process in which individuals
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are inspecting and altering their forecasting records in ways to
eliminate systematic forecast errors. It is also sometimes said
that to embody the idea that economists and the agents they
are modelling should be placed on equal footing: the agents in
the model should be able to forecast and profit-maximize and
utility-maximize as well as...the econometrician who constructed
the model (Sargent [1993], p.21).
Sargent argues, however, that “these ways of explaining things are sugges-
tive, but misleading, because they make rational expectations sound less
restrictive and more behavioral than it really is.(Sargent [1993, p.21]).”
While the compatibility of the REH with the basic rationality postulate in
economics awaits the ultimate discovery of the true model of aggregate behav-
ior, or the so-called “objective”probability distribution, the IKF framework
oﬀers an approach to the modeling of forecasting models, and their revisions,
by rational agents in a world in which the “scientific problem” has not been
solved.
In view of its recognition that the creative process governing the acquisi-
tion of knowledge can at best be characterized in a qualitative as opposed to
a quantitative manner, the IKF framework imposes only qualitative condi-
tions on the form and updating of individual forecasting models. Moreover,
by not restricting the forecasting models and the revision process of agents
to a specific set of quantitative rules, such a qualitative approach to the mod-
eling of the forecasting process is compatible with the postulate of individual
rationality.
Before we conclude this paper, we should acknowledge that the foregoing
arguments concerning the fundamental theoretical diﬃculties of the REH
draw on many of the great debates in social sciences. Insistence on ban-
ning free parameters arising from agents’ expectations from macroeconomic
analysis is reminiscent of the perennial attempts to discover the secret mech-
anism behind the apparent contingencies of historical events. This has been
pursued by Hegel, Marx and many other thinkers and has by now been gen-
erally abandoned.59 In particular, this kind of approach leaves no room for
human spontaneity and innovation which drive not only history, but also
the dynamism of capitalist market economies and economic development in
59For two prominent examples of analyses of this point and related issues, see Popper
(1964) and Hayek (1978).
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general.60
The inherent impossibility of quantifying the creative process govern-
ing the acquisition of knowledge by rational agents in modern, capitalist
economies, leads us to the conclusion that macroeconomists will need to con-
tinue to work with aggregate relationships containing free parameters aris-
ing from individual forecasting models. Because the IKF framework makes
only qualitative assumptions about these models, it does not have to pre-
specify quantitative models used by individual agents and, thus, in contrast
to the REH, is compatible with individual rationality in a world of imperfect
knowledge.61 Moreover, as we have shown in this paper, models based on the
qualitative IKF approach can explain the behavior of asset price dynamics
that the REH models deem anomalous.
60See Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) for empirical evidence on the im-
portance of this point for understanding the role of private ownership. Phelps (2003) puts
forth many compelling reasons for the importance of according expectations an active role
in economic analysis and for explaining macroeconomic behavior of capitalist economies.
61The qualitative IKF approach should also be contrasted with some recent attempts by
leading scholars working in the REH tradition to introduce diversity of forecasting models
into the analysis of expectations. For example, Hansen and Sargent (2001a) have expressed
genuine concern about the epistemological and behavioral foundations of the REH. Nev-
ertheless, after acknowledging the importance of letting “agents inside the economist’s
model share his doubts about the model specification (p. 3),” they move on to restrict
the set of “misspecified models” so as to preserve the basic features of the REH approach.
See also Hansen and Sargent (2001b).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 in Section 4.1: Since the proof for a bear is
analogous, we provide the proof for a bull only. Moreover, we consider in-
creases in s˜it+1 only, as the proof for decreases is identical. Thus, we will
show that if ∆s˜it+1 > 0, then ∆l
i
t > 0, thereby violating (21), irrespective
of whether the higher forecast stems from the new realizations of xit or the
updating of the parameter vector θit. Thus, suppose for some reason that
s˜it+1increases to some higher value, say, s˜
ih
t+1.
62 Rewriting (24) implies that:
∆lit = l
i
t(s˜
ih
t+1, x
i
t, θ
i
t)− lit(s˜it+1, xit, θit) (48)
= r˜iht+1P it [it < −r˜iht+1|xiht , θiht ]− r˜it+1P it [it < −r˜it+1|xit, θit]
− EPit [
i
tI(−r˜iht+1 < it < −r˜it+1)|xit, θit, xiht , θiht ]
where to collapse the diﬀerence in expectations we used the assumption that
except for the conditional mean s˜it+1, all other moments of the distribution
have remained unchanged, i.e.:
EPit [
i
tI(
i
t < −r˜
ih
t+1)|xiht , θiht ]−EPit [itI(it < −r˜it+1)|xit, θit] = (49)
= −EPit [
i
tI(−r˜
ih
t+1 < 
i
t < −r˜it+1)|xit, θit, xiht , θiht ]
Furthermore we note that:
−EPit [
i
tI(−r˜iht+1 < it < −r˜it+1)|xit, θit, xiht , θiht ] ≥
≥ r˜it+1P it [it < −r˜it+1|xit, θit]− r˜it+1P it [it < −r˜iht+1|xiht , θiht ] (50)
Using (50) in (48) and (49), leads us to a lower bound for ∆lit i.e
∆lit ≥ (r˜iht+1 − r˜it+1)P it [it < −r˜iht+1|xiht , θiht ] > 0
This completes the proof of the lemma.
62Strictly speaking we analyze here a jump in s˜it+1. But the same argument would work
for continuous changes occuring within the infinite decimal interval (t, t + h).Then, the
derivatives would be defined in a completely standard way by letting h→ 0. Our analysis
can be easily seen as applying to both jumps and continuous changes, but analyzing jumps
is notationally simpler.
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Proof of Proposition 2 in Section 4.1: In contrast to the proof propo-
sition 1, the agent’s expectation cannot be collapsed as in (49) because the
distribution of it after the updating of s˜
i
t+1 is diﬀerent than before. Thus
we denote the post-updating random variable by iht . It readily follows from
(48) and (49) that if©
r˜
ih
t+1P it [iht < −r˜iht+1|xiht , θiht ]− r˜it+1P it [it < −r˜it+1|xit, θit]
ª
< 0 and (51)
EPit [
ih
t
i
tI(
ih
t < −r˜iht+1)|xiht , θiht ]−EPit [itI(it < −r˜it+1)|xit, θit] < 0 (52)
then ∆lit < 0
implying that there exist conditions on an updating of the higher moments
of agent’s subjective distribution, i.e. (51) and (52), such that the updating
of the expected loss part of the distribution is consistent with the gap-eﬀect.
Proof of Lemma 2 in Section 4.2.1: With ρi = ρ for all agents, (34)
can be written as follows:
dupt =
nl+nsX
i
wiI(typei)dupit =
nl+nsX
i
wi
µ
ρi + γi
ds˜at+1
ds˜ait+1
¶
ds˜ait+1
= ρ
nl+nsX
i
wids˜ait+1 + ds˜t+1
nl+nsX
i
wiγi = (ρ+ γ) ds˜at+1 (53)
where γ denotes the weighted average of the γi’s. Since (ρ+ γ) > 0, duptds˜at+1 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3 in section 4.2.1: Given the following:
ds˜at+1 =
n1X
i
wids˜
ai1
t+1 +
n2X
i
wids˜
ai2
t+1 > 0 (54)
dupi1t =
1
αi1
I(typei)ds˜
ai1
t+1 where
1
αi1
= ρi1 + γi1
ds˜at+1
ds˜
ai1
t+1
(55)
dupi2t =
1
αi2
I(typei)ds˜
ai2
t+1 where
1
αi2
= ρi2 + γi2
ds˜at+1
ds˜
ai2
t+1
(56)
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we know
n1X
i
αi1wiI(type
i)dupi1t +
n2X
i
αi2wiI(type
i)dupi2t > 0 (57)
Given that condition (35) can be written as max1(αi) < min2(αi), we know
that
0 <
n1X
i
αi1wiI(type
i)dupi1t +
n2X
i
αi2wiI(type
i)dupi2t
< max
1
(αi)
n1X
i
wiI(type
i)dupi1t +min
2
(αi)
n2X
i
wiI(type
i)dupi2t
< max
1
(αi)
Ã n1X
i
wiI(type
i)dupi1t +
n2X
i
wiI(type
i)dupi2t
!
= max
1
(αi)dupt
(58)
Since max1(αi) > 0, dupt > 0.
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